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Abstract
Most comparisons of preferences have the structure of single-crossing
dominance. We examine the lattice structure of single-crossing dom-
inance, proving characterisation, existence and uniqueness results for
minimum upper bounds of arbitrary sets of preferences. We apply these
theorems to monotone comparative statics, ambiguity- and risk-aversion,
social choice, and politically correct discourse.
1 Introduction
Comparisons of preferences are ubiquitous in economics: examples include
‘more risk-averse/ambiguity-averse than’ (in decision theory),1 ‘takes larger ac-
tions than’ (in monotone comparative statics),2 ‘more delay-averse/impatient
than’ (in dynamic problems),3 and ‘more self-controlled than’ (in models
of temptation).4 All of these preference comparisons, and most others be-
sides, are special cases of single-crossing dominance, a general unified way of
comparing preferences.
In this paper, we investigate the lattice structure of single-crossing dom-
inance. In particular, in §2, we characterise the minimum upper bounds of
∗We are grateful to Eddie Dekel, Péter Eső, Alessandro Pavan, John Quah and Bruno
Strulovici for guidance and comments, and to Paweł Dziewulski, Matteo Escudé, Peter
Klibanoff, Meg Meyer, Marciano Siniscalchi, Lorenzo Stanca, Tomasz Strzalecki and three
audiences at Northwestern for helpful comments and suggestions.
1Yaari (1969), Epstein (1999), Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002).
2Topkis (1978), Milgrom and Shannon (1994), LiCalzi and Veinott (1992).
3Horowitz (1992), Benoît and Ok (2007).
4Gül and Pesendorfer (2001), Dekel and Lipman (2008).
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arbitrary sets of preferences, and give necessary and sufficient conditions for
their existence and uniqueness.
We use our theorems to derive new results in a variety of economic settings
that feature some of the aforementioned preference comparisons. In §3, we
develop a theory of monotone comparative statics for the consensus of a group
of agents as well as a theory of misspecification-robust comparative statics. In
§4, we characterise a general class of maxmin preferences over acts as precisely
minimum upper bounds with respect to ‘more ambiguity-averse than’. In
§5, we characterise when acceptable aggregation of individual preferences
is possible in the presence of normative constraints. Additionally, alongside
the general theory in §2, we study the political correctness, coherence and
concordance of expressed views in a politically correct society.
1.1 Theory
The abstract environment consists of a non-empty set X of alternatives
equipped with a partial order &.5 Write P for the set of all preferences
(complete and transitive binary relations) on X . One preference single-
crossing dominates another iff the former is more disposed to favour &-larger
alternatives:
Definition 1. For two preferences ,′ ∈ P, we write ′ S  iff for any
pair x & y in X , x () y implies x ′(′) y. We say that ′ single-crossing
dominates .6
Given a set of preferences P ⊆ P , a preference ′ ∈ P is an upper bound
of P iff ′ S  for every  ∈ P , and a minimum upper bound iff in addition
′′ S ′ for every (other) upper bound ′′ of P .7 Intuitively, a minimum
upper bound of P is a preference that likes large alternatives more than
does any preference in P , but only just. Maximum lower bounds are defined
analogously.
In §2, we study the (complete) lattice structure of the poset (P, S) by
developing characterisation, existence and uniqueness results for minimum up-
5Definitions of standard concepts such as these are collected in appendix A.
6This definition is from Milgrom and Shannon (1994), in the context of monotone
comparative statics. This type of preference comparison has been used at least since Yaari’s
(1969) definition of ‘more risk-averse than’ (see §4.4). The term ‘single-crossing’ originates
in early information economics, where the ‘(Spence–Mirrlees) single-crossing condition’
plays an important role (Mirrlees, 1971; Spence, 1973).
7One may similarly define a minimal upper bound as an upper bound ′ such that
there is no (other) upper bound ′′ with ′ 6S ′′ S ′. We do not study minimal upper
bounds in this paper.
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per bounds. Our characterisation theorem (§2.1) characterises the minimum
upper bounds of arbitrary sets P ⊆ P of preferences. Our existence theorem
(§2.2) identifies the condition on &, called crown- and diamond-freeness,
that is necessary and sufficient for every P ⊆ P to possess a minimum
upper bound. (In appendix I, we provide a graphical characterisation of
crown- and diamond-freeness in terms of the transitive reduction.) Finally,
our uniqueness proposition (§2.3) asserts that every set P ⊆ P has a unique
minimum upper bound precisely if & is complete. We extend our results to
maximum lower bounds in appendix F.
1.2 Applications
We employ our theorems to answer a broad range of economic questions.
Application to politically correct discourse (§2). This application is
developed in §2 alongside the general theory. There is a set X of social issues.
Political correctness demands that some issues x be prioritied over others y;
we write x & y when this is the case.
A set of agents have coherent (i.e. transitive) priorities, formally anti-
symmetric preferences P ⊆ P. An agent’s view (priority)  ∈ P on a pair
of issues x, y ∈ X with x & y is politically correct if x  y, and politically
incorrect otherwise. A priority ′ is more politically correct than another
priority  iff the former holds a politically correct view whenever the latter
does—that is, iff ′ S .
The agents meet and discuss, and leave the conversation with expressed
views (priorites), formed (roughly) as follows. If an agent’s view on a pair of
issues is politically incorrect, but her conversational partner holds the polit-
ically correct view, then the agent self-censors by expressing the politically
correct priority. Otherwise, she expresses her true view.
How politically correct will agents’ expressed views be? When can we be
assured that expressed views are coherent? And when is consensus assured?
We answer these questions alongside the general theory in §2.
Application to monotone comparative statics (§3). In monotone com-
parative statics, an agent chooses an alternative from a set X ⊆ R. Write
X() for the set of optimal alternatives when the agent’s preference is  ∈ P .
The canonical result states that if  increases in the sense of S, then X()
increases in the strong set order. We extend this result in two directions.
First, suppose that there is a group of agents with preferences P ⊆ P.
The consensus is the set of alternatives that they all find optimal: C(P ) =
3
⋂
∈P X(). Using the existence theorem, we show that when the set P
increases in the strong set order, so does the consensus C(P ).
Second, suppose that an analyst desires a comparative statics conclusion,
but knows only that the agent’s preference lies in a set P ⊆ P . We show using
the existence theorem that the set X(P ) := ⋃∈P X() of possibly-optimal
alternatives increases in a natural weakening of the strong set order whenever
P does.
Application to ambiguity- and risk-aversion (§4). Consider the stand-
ard Savage framework with monetary prizes, and let X be a set of acts. One
preference is more ambiguity-averse than another iff whenever the latter
(strictly) prefers a constant act to a non-constant one, so does the latter.
Say that a set P ⊆ P of monotone and solvable preferences is a maxmin
representation of a preference ? ∈ P iff the latter is ordinally represented
by X 7→ inf∈P c(, X), where c(, X) denotes the certainty equivalent of
an act X according to preference . Maxmin expected utility (Gilboa &
Schmeidler, 1989) is a (very) special case.
We characterise the maxmin class by proving that P is a maxmin rep-
resentation of ? if, and only if, ? is a minimum upper bound of P with
respect to ‘more ambiguity-averse than’. A comparative statics result follows:
when P increases in appropriate sense, ? becomes more ambiguity-averse.
Another corollary is that every set of monotone and solvable preferences over
acts possesses exactly one minimum upper bound.
These results carry over to risk-aversion.
Application to social choice (§5). A group of individuals, each with
preferences over a set X of social alternatives, must aggregate their preferences
into a social preference.
For certain pairs x, y ∈ X of alternatives, it is normatively acceptable to
rank y above x only with the consent of every individual—we write x & y
when this is the case. A SWF is acceptable iff it respects this constraint and
satisfies a suitable Pareto criterion.
We prove an (im)possibility theorem that gives the necessary and sufficient
condition on & for acceptable SWF to exist. The conditions are stringent—
they imply crown- and diamond-freeness—yielding a negative conclusion akin
to Sen’s (1970) ‘impossibility of a Paretian liberal’. But there are good news,
too: we exhibit some natural normative constraints for which acceptable
aggregation is possible according to our theorem.
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1.3 Related literature
Our work relates to the combinatorics literature on permutation lattices
(Bennett & Birkhoff, 1994; Markowsky, 1991; Duquenne & Cherfouh, 1994).
Here the alternatives are X = {1, . . . , n} for some n ∈ N, and the partial
order & is the ordinary inequality. This means in particular that & is complete
and that X is finite.
In this context, anti-symmetric (i.e. never-indifferent) preferences may be
thought of as permutations, and single-crossing dominance is known as the
weak order.8 It has been known since Guilbaud and Rosenstiehl (1963) and
Yanagimoto and Okamoto (1969) that the set of all permutations equipped
with the weak order is a (complete) lattice. Châtel, Pilaud and Pons (2018)
extend this result to other sets of binary relations on X . Our uniqueness
proposition is a result along these lines.
Since this literature assumes that & is complete, it certainly contains no
analogue of our existence theorem. We are not aware of any analogue of our
characterisation theorem, either. Besides avoiding the restrictive assumption
that & is complete, we differ from this literature by allowing for preferences
with indifferences and by permitting X to be of unrestricted cardinality.
Crown- and diamond-freeness are standard concepts in combinatorics;
the former is studied by e.g. Lu (2014), and the latter by Griggs, Li and
Lu (2012). Truss (1996), Ball, Pultr and Sichler (2006) and Gray and Truss
(2009) study crown- and diamond-freeness together.
We discuss literature relevant to the applications in their respective
sections.
2 Theory
In this section, we develop our general results about the lattice structure of
single-crossing: the characterisation theorem (§2.1), the existence theorem
(§2.2) and the uniqueness proposition (§2.3). Recall the abstract environment
and basic definitions from §1.1.
To motivate and illustrate the results, we introduce the following model
of public discourse in the presence of political correctness.
Application to politically correct discourse. In a society with norms
of political correctness, people frequently self-censor rather than express
their politically incorrect views publicly. We ask how much self-censorship
occurs, when self-censorship may lead to incoherent expressed views, and
8Also called the ‘right permutahedron order’, or the ‘weak Bruhat order’.
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when self-censorship is so severe that it leads to a consensus of expressed
opinions.
Loury (1994) and Morris (2001) also study discourse under political
correctness. Their framework and questions differ greatly from ours: Morris
(2001) considers a game of cheap-talk communication in which the sender
knows that the receiver entertains doubts about whether she is biased, and
studies how this impedes information transmission. Loury (1994) tells a
similar story without a formal model.
There is a set X of social issues. Some issues x have higher political
priority than others y, meaning that it is politically incorrect to express the
view that y should be prioritised over x; we write x & y when this is the
case. Assume that & is a partial order.
For instance, the political issues could include economic justice for ethnic
minorities (x), for women (y), and for ethnic-majority men (z). In this
case, political correctness may demand that ethnic minorities and women
be prioritied over ethnic-majority men (x & z and y & z), while remaining
silent on the relative importance of economic justice for ethnic minorities
and for women (x, y are &-incomparable).
A priority is a complete and (for simplicity) anti-symmetric (i.e. never-
indifferent) binary relation  on X . ‘x  y’ expresses the view that society
ought to prioritise issue x over issue y. A priority is coherent iff it is transitive.
Say that a priority ′ is more politically correct than another priority
 iff for any pair x, y ∈ X with x & y, x  y implies x ′ y. Observe that
this is precisely single-crossing dominance, extended to possibly intransitive
relations.9
There are two agents, whose true views are described by coherent priorities
P = {1,2}. (The analysis extends straightforwardly to the case of many
agents.) The agents converse about about what social priorities over X ought
to be, and leave the conversation with expressed priorities ′1 and ′2.
An agent is willing to express to her politically incorrect view on a pair
of issues x, y ∈ X only if her interlocutor holds the same view; otherwise,
she self-censors. In particular, consider issues x & y. If either agent holds the
politically correct view that x should be prioritised over y, then both express
the politically correct view. (Schematically, if either x 1 y or x 2 y, then
x ′1 y and x ′2 y.) There is a caveat: if x1 & · · · & xK and some agent holds
the politically correct view on each pair xk, xk+1, then agents self-censor on
x1, xK by expressing the view that x1 should be prioritised over xK , even
if both hold the politically incorrect view on x1, xK . There is at least one
9Recall that we are considering only anti-symmetric relations.
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priority that satisfies these constraints. If there are several, then we assume
that agents express a coherent priority if possible.
To illustrate, suppose that there are three issues X = {x, y, z}, and
that political correctness demands that x > y > z. If agents’s views are
z 1 x 1 y and y 2 z 2 x, then both express the view x ′i y since x & y
and x 1 y, and both express y ′i z since y & z and y 2 z. They therefore
also express the politically correct view x ′i z, even though both agents’
true views on x, z are politically incorrect (viz. z i x).
How much self-censorship will occur? (§2.1: by the characterisation the-
orem, both agents’ expressed priorities will be more politically correct than
either agent’s true view, but no more politically correct than that.) Do agents
express coherent (i.e. transitive) priorities, no matter what their (coherent)
true views P = {1,2}? (§2.2: yes iff & is crown- and diamond-free, by the
existence theorem.) Is there expressed consensus, no matter what the true
views P? (§2.3: yes iff & is complete, by the uniqueness proposition.)
2.1 Characterisation of minimum upper bounds
In this section, we characterise the minimum upper bounds of an arbitrary set
P ⊆ P of preferences. Our characterisation is in terms of P -chains, defined
as follows.
Definition 2. For a set P ⊆ P of preferences and two alternatives x & y in
X , a P -chain from x to y is a finite sequence (wk)Kk=1 in X such that
(i) w1 = x and wK = y,
(ii) for every k < K, wk & wk+1, and
(iii) for every k < K, wk  wk+1 for some  ∈ P .
A strict P -chain is a P -chain with wk  wk+1 for some k < K and  ∈ P .
In a word, P -chain is a &-decreasing sequence of alternatives along which,
at each juncture (each k < K), some preference in P prefers the previous
(&-larger) alternative to the subsequent (&-smaller) one. Note that a P -chain
of length K ≥ 3 is simply the concatenation of K − 1 P -chains of length 2.
Example 1. Consider X = {x, y, z, w}, with & such that x > w and
x > y > z (so x > z), and w, y and w, z are incomparable. The partial order
7
& may be depicted graphically as
x
y
z
w
In this (standard) diagram, there is an edge (‘link’) from a down to b iff
a & b. The absence of an edge therefore represents &-incomparability. We
will use diagrams of this sort throughout.
Consider P = {1,2}, where
z 1 w 1 x 1 y and y 2 z 2 w 2 x.
Since x & y and x 1 y, (x, y) is a strict P -chain. (y, z) is similarly a strict
P -chain. It follows that there is a strict P -chain from x to z, namely (x, y, z).
Note, however, that (x, z) is not a P -chain, since neither preference ranks x
above z.
Although x & w, there is no P -chain from x to w: the only candidate is
(x,w), and it fails to be a P -chain because neither preference favours x over
w.
We begin by characterising upper bounds (minimum or not) in terms of
P -chains. An upper bound of P ⊆ P is precisely a preference that (strictly)
prefers a larger alternative to a smaller one whenever there is a (strict)
P -chain between them:
UB characterisation lemma. For a preference ′ ∈ P and a set P ⊆ P
of preferences, the following are equivalent:
(1) ′ is an upper bound of P .
(2) ′ satisfies: for any &-comparable x, y ∈ X , wlog x & y,
(i) x ′ y if there is a P -chain from x to y, and
(ii) y ′ x only if there is no strict P -chain from x to y.
Example 1 (continued). The P -chains, all of them strict, are (x, y), (y, z)
and (x, y, z). Thus by the UB characterisation lemma, a preference ′ ∈ P
is an upper bound of P iff x ′ y ′ z (and x ′ z). Thus,
x ′a y ′a z ′a w and w ′b x ′b y ′b z
are both upper bounds.
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Proof. (2) implies (1): Let ′ ∈ P satisfy condition (2); we wish to show
that ′ S  for any  ∈ P . To that end, fix a &-comparable pair x, y ∈ X ,
wlog x & y, and suppose that x () y for some  ∈ P ; we must show that
x ′(′) y. This is immediate since (x, y) is a (strict) P -chain.
(1) implies (2): Let ′ be an upper bound of P . Fix a &-comparable pair
x, y ∈ X , wlog x & y. We must show that if there is a (strict) P -chain from
x to y, then x ′(′) y.
Suppose that there exists a P -chain (wk)Kk=1 from x to y. For each k < K,
we have wk & wk+1 as well as wk  wk+1 for some  ∈ P . Since ′ is an
upper bound of P , it must be that wk ′ wk+1 for each k < K. Since ′ is
transitive (because it lives in P), it follows that x ′ y.
Suppose that there exists a strict P -chain (wk)Kk=1 from x to y. As in
the weak case, it must be that wk ′ wk+1 for each k < K. Moreover, since
the P -chain is strict, we have wk  wk+1 for some k < K and  ∈ P ; hence
wk ′ wk+1 since ′ is an upper bound of P . It follows by transitivity of ′
that x ′ y. 
The UB characterisation lemma says that an upper bound must have
a (strict) ‘upward’ preference whenever there is a (strict) P -chain. Our
characterisation theorem says that the minimum upper bounds are those
which have a (strict) ‘upward’ preference only when there is a (strict) P -chain:
Characterisation theorem. For a preference ? ∈ P and a set P ⊆ P of
preferences, the following are equivalent:
(1) ? is a minimum upper bound of P .
(2) ? satisfies: for any &-comparable x, y ∈ X , wlog x & y,
(?) x ? y iff there is a P -chain from x to y, and
(??) y ? x iff there is no strict P -chain from x to y.
The analogous characterisation for maximum lower bounds is given in
appendix F.
Example 1 (continued). A minimum upper bound ? ∈ P must satisfy
x ? y ? z (and x ? z) since it is an upper bound. Since x & w but
there is no P -chain from x to w, minimumhood requires that w ? x by the
characterisation theorem. In sum, ? ∈ P is a minimum upper bound iff
w ? x ? y ? z.
(There is clearly exactly one such preference.)
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One direction of the proof is straightforward:
Proof that (2) implies (1). Fix a subset P of P and a ? ∈ P that satisfies
(?)–(??). It is immediate from the UB characterisation lemma that ? is an
upper bound of P .
To see that ? is a minimum of the upper bounds of P , let ′ be any
upper bound of P . Fix a &-comparable pair x, y ∈ X , wlog x & y, and
suppose that x ?(?) y. By property (?) (property (??)), there must be
a (strict) P -chain from x to y. Since ′ is an upper bound of P , it follows
by the UB characterisation lemma that x ′(′) y. Since x, y ∈ X were
arbitrary, this establishes that ′ S ?. 
The other direction requires the following lemma, whose (rather involved)
proof is given in appendix C (p. 36).
Lemma 1. Let P be a set of preferences, and let x, y ∈ X be &-comparable,
wlog x & y. If there is no (strict) P -chain from x to y, then there exists an
upper bound ′′ of P with x ′′(′′) y.
Proof that (1) implies (2). Fix a set P ⊆ P of preferences and a preference
′ ∈ P. We will prove the contra-positive: if ′ violates (?)–(??), then it
cannot be a minimum upper bound of P . If a preference ′ violates the ‘if’
part of (?) or the ‘only if’ part of (??), then it fails to be an upper bound of
P by the UB characterisation lemma.
Suppose that a preference ′ violates the ‘only if’ part of (?) (the ‘if’
part of (??)). In particular, there are &-comparable x, y ∈ X , wlog x & y,
such that there is no (strict) P -chain from x to y, and yet x ′(′) y. By
Lemma 1, there is an upper bound ′′ of P such that x ′′(′′) y. Then
′′ 6S ′, so ′ fails to be a minimum of the upper bounds of P . 
Application to politically correct discourse (continued). The charac-
terisation theorem permits us to show that agents will express priorities
that are more politically correct than either agent’s true view, but no more
politically correct than that. That is, their expressed views ′1 and ′2 are
both minimum upper bounds (with respect to ‘more politically correct than’)
of P = {1,2}.
Suppose that x > y and that there is a (necessarily strict) P -chain
(wk)Kk=1 from x to y.10 For each k < K, since wk & wk+1 and one of the
agents holds the politically correct view wk i wk+1, both agents’ expressed
10All P -chains are strict because we assumed (for simplicity) that 1 and 2 are
anti-symmetric (never indifferent).
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priorities favour wk over wk+1. Both expressed views ′1 and ′2 therefore
prioritise x over y.
Suppose on the other hand that x > y that there is no P -chain from x
to y. Then both agents express their politically incorrect view that y should
be prioritsed over x.
Since x, y ∈ X were arbitrary, this shows that ′1 and ′2 satisfy properties
(?)–(??). Thus, by the characterisation theorem, the expressed views ′1 and
′2 are minimum upper bounds of the agents’ true views P = {1,2}, in
the extended sense that does not require them to be coherent (i.e. to live in
P).
2.2 Existence of minimum upper bounds
In this section, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on & for
minimum upper bounds to exist for every set of preferences. This condition
rules out two kinds of special subposet: crowns and diamonds.
In §2.2.1, we define crowns and show that & must be free of them if every
set of preferences is to possess a minimum upper bound. In §2.2.2, we do the
same for diamonds. In §2.2.3, we give the existence theorem, which asserts
in addition that crown- and diamond-freeness of & is sufficient for every set
of preferences to possess a minimum upper bound. In appendix I, we provide
an alternative characterisation of crown- and diamond-freeness in terms of
the transitive reduction.
2.2.1 Crowns
The following example identifies a & for which a certain P ⊆ P admits no
minimum upper bound:
Example 2. Consider X = {x, y, z, w} with the following partial order &:
x
y
z
w
That is, each of x and z &-dominate each of y and w, but x, z and are
&-incomparable, as are y, w. Let P = {1,2} ⊆ P, where
w 1 x 1 y 1 z and y 2 z 2 w 2 x.
x & y and z & w, and there is a strict P -chain from x to y and from z to w.
On the other hand, x & w and z & y, but there is no P -chain from x to w
11
a1
a2
a3
a4
(a) A 4-crown.
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
a6
(b) A 6-crown.
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
a6
a7
a8
(c) An 8-crown.
Figure 1 – Crowns.
or from z to y. So by the characterisation theorem (p. 9), a minimum upper
bound ? of P must have
x ? y ? z ? w ? x.
Such a ? cannot be transitive, so cannot live in P. It follows that no
minimum upper bound exists.
The feature of & in Example 2 that causes existence to fail is that is
contains a crown, defined as follows.
Definition 3. Let ≥ be a binary relation on a set A. For K ≥ 4 even,
a K-crown is a sequence (ak)Kk=1 in A such that non-adjacent ak, ak′ are
≥-incomparable,11 and ak−1 > ak < ak+1 for each 1 < k ≤ K even (where
aK+1 := a1 by convention). A crown is a K-crown for some K ≥ 4 even. ≥
is crown-free iff it contains no crowns.
Some crowns are drawn in Figure 1.
Example 2 (continued). & contains the 4-crown (x, y, z, w), so fails to be
crown-free.
Crown-freeness rules out a specific form of incompleteness. A strong
sufficient condition is completeness. A weaker sufficient condition is that the
comparability relation ≤≥ be transitive.12 Neither is necessary:
Example 3. Consider X with the partial order & given by
x
y z
w
11Schematically: for 1 ≤ k < k + 2 ≤ k′ ≤ K, we have ak  ak′  ak.
12Given a binary relation ≥, comparability ≤≥ is defined by a ≤≥ b iff either a ≥ b or b ≥ a.
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That is: x & y & w and x & z & w (hence x & w by transitivity of &), but
y, z are &-incomparable. & is not complete since y, z are &-incomparable.
Nor is .& transitive, since y .& x .& z but y, z are &-incomparable. But & is
manifestly crown-free.
A small elaboration of the reasoning in Example 2 shows that the presence
of a crown implies the existence of a pair of preferences with no minimum
upper bound:
Lemma 2 (necessity of crown-freeness). If every pair of preferences possesses
a join, then & is crown-free.
Proof. We prove the contra-positive. Suppose that & contains a crown
(x1, . . . , xK). Consider P = {a,b} ⊆ P, where
xK a x1 a x2 a · · · a xK−2 a xK−1
x2 b x3 b · · · b xK−1 b xK b x1.
For 1 < k ≤ K even, xk−1 > xk and xk−1  xk for some  ∈ P (in particular,
a for k < K even, b for k > 1 even). Hence (xk−1, xk) is a strict P -chain,
so by the characterisation theorem (p. 9), xk−1 ? xk for any minimum
upper bound ? of P .
Moreover, for 1 < k ≤ K even, xk+1 > xk, and xk+1  xk for all  ∈ P .
(This is apparent, separately, for k < K even and for k = K.) Hence there is
no P -chain from xk+1 to xk, so by the characterisation theorem, xk ? xk+1
for any minimum upper bound of ? of P .
It follows that any minimum upper bound ? of P must satisfy
x1 ? x2 ? · · · ? xK−1 ? xK ? x1.
Such a ? cannot be transitive, so cannot live in P; hence P admits no
minimum upper bound. 
Application to politically correct discourse (continued). Lemma 2 tells
us that self-censorship may lead agents to express incoherent (i.e. intransitive)
views. By way of illustration, consider the issues of economic justice for ethnic
minorities (x), for young ethnic-majority men (y), for women (z) and for
older ethnic-majority men (w). Political correctness & is plausibly as in
Example 2: ethnic minorities and women are favoured over ethnic-majority
men (both x and z &-dominate both y and w), and the relative importance
of ethnic minorities and women and of ethnic-majority men of different ages
is indeterminate (x, z and y, w &-incomparable). That is: (x, y, z, w) is a
crown.
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Agent 1 favours prioritising w over z, but since z & w and agent 2 holds
the politically correct view z 2 w, agent 1 expresses the view that z ′1 w.
On all other pairs of issues, she expresses her true view; in particular, she
favours w over x, x over y and y over z. Her expressed view ′1 therefore
satisfies
w ′1 x ′1 y ′1 z ′1 w,
so is incoherent. Agent 2’s post-conversation preference is incoherent for a
similar reason.
2.2.2 Diamonds
Existence can fail even in the absence of crowns:
Example 3 (continued). Let P = {1,2} ⊆ P, where
y 1 w 1 z 1 x and w 2 z 2 x 2 y.
There is a strict P -chain from x to w (viz. (x, y, w)). We have z & w but
no P -chain from z to w, and x & z but no P -chain from x to z. So by the
characterisation theorem (p. 9), a minimum upper bound ? of P must
satisfy
x ? w ? z ? x.
Since such a relation ? cannot be transitive, it follows that P admits no
minimum upper bound.
The trouble is that & contains a diamond:
Definition 4. Let ≥ be a partial order on a set A. A diamond is four
elements (a, b, c, d) of A such that a ≥ b ≥ d and a ≥ c ≥ d, but b, c are
≥-incomparable. ≥ is diamond-free iff it contains no diamonds.
Example 3 (continued). (x, y, z, w) is a diamond: x & y & w and x & z & w,
but y, z are &-incomparable. & therefore fails to be diamond-free.
Like crown-freeness, diamond-freeness rules out a specific form of incom-
pleteness, and is implied by strong forms of ‘limited completeness’ such as
completeness of ≥ or transitivity of the comparability relation ≤≥. Neither of
these conditions is necessary for diamond-freeness, nor is crown-freeness:
Example 2 (continued). We saw that there is a crown. But by inspection,
there are no diamonds. Since & is not complete and .& is intransitive, this
also shows that diamond-freeness is weaker than these sufficient conditions.
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Lemma 3 (necessity of diamond-freeness). If every pair of preferences
possesses a join, then & is diamond-free.
The proof is almost exactly Example 3, so we omit it.
2.2.3 The existence theorem
We have seen in the last two sections that crown-freeness and diamond-
freeness are individually necessary for every set of preferences to possess a
minimum upper bound. The existence theorem asserts that these conditions
are also jointly sufficient:
Existence theorem. The following are equivalent:
(1) Every set of preferences has a minimum upper bound.
(2) Every pair of preferences has a minimum upper bound.
(3) & is crown- and diamond-free.
Remark 1. This is a ‘forbidden subposet’ theorem: it characterises the
class of posets (X ,&) on which all sets of preferences admit minimum upper
bounds as precisely those that contain no crowns or diamonds as subposets.13
By way of illustration, crown- and diamond-freeness fails in Examples 2
and 3, but is satisfied in Example 1 (p. 7). More generally, it holds whenever
there are three or fewer alternatives, and fails for any lattice (X ,&) that
is not a chain.14 To better understand the existence theorem, we provide a
graphical interpretation of crown- and diamond-freeness in appendix I.
In appendix F, we show further that these properties are equivalent to
every set (or two-element set) of preferences possessing a maximum lower
bound. By analogy with complete lattices, call (P, S) a complete pre-lattice
(a pre-lattice) iff every set P ⊆ P (every two-element set P ⊆ P) possesses a
minimum upper bound and maximum lower bound.15 The existence theorem
implies that (P, S) is a complete pre-lattice iff it is a pre-lattice iff & contains
no crowns or diamonds.
13A subposet of (X ,&) is (Y,&Y) where Y ⊆ X and &Y is the restriction of & to Y.
14If (X ,&) is a lattice but not a chain, then there are &-incomparable x, y ∈ X , in which
case (x ∧ y, x, y, x ∨ y) is a diamond.
15(P, S) is not a complete lattice because S is not anti-symmetric in general, so that
S fails to be a partial order. S is a pre-order (reflexive and transitive), though; hence
the term ‘complete pre-lattice’. The failure of anti-symmetry means that minimum upper
bounds and maximum lower bounds need not be unique; we study this issue in §2.3.
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As for the proof, it is immediate that (1) implies (2), and we have already
established in Lemmata 2 and 3 that (2) implies (3). Proving that (3) implies
(1) is more difficult; we do this in appendix D. The idea is as follows. Let
◦ be the minimal binary relation (in general incomplete) that satisfies
properties (?)–(??) in the characterisation theorem (p. 9). We show first
that absent diamonds in &, ◦ must be ‘weakly transitive’. We then show
that when there are no crowns in &, weak transitivity of ◦ implies that it
satisfies a stronger transitivity-type property called Suzumura-consistency.
This permits us to invoke an extension theorem due to Suzumura (1976)
(stated in appendix B) to conclude that ◦ can be extended to a complete
and transitive relation (i.e. a preference). This preference is a minimum upper
bound by the characterisation theorem.
Application to politically correct discourse (continued). We saw that
in Example 2, where & contains a crown, the agents’ expressed views are
incoherent. The same is true in Example 3, where & contains a diamond. In
these examples, the need to self-censor causes agents to express incoherent
views despite the fact that their true views are coherent.
The existence theorem tells us that that the expressed views in a conver-
sation between any two agents P = {1,2} are coherent if, and only if, &
has neither crowns nor diamonds. In other words, the societies in which self-
censorship leaves room for coherent expressions of opinion are precisely those
in which the norms & of political correctness are crown- and diamond-free.
Crowns and diamonds can plausibly occur in political correctness &. We
already gave an example of four issues that are plausibly a crown. As for
diamonds, the following issues are a plausible example: economic justice for
ethnic-minority women (x), ethnic-minority men (y), ethnic-majority women
(z) and ethnic-majority men (w). Self-censorship may therefore plausibly
lead to incoherent expressed views in some conversations.
2.3 Uniqueness of minimum upper bounds
The existence theorem tells us when minimum upper bounds are guaranteed
to exist. They are not unique, in general:
Example 4. Consider X = {x, y} with the empty partial order &, so that
x, y are &-incomparable. Let P = {1,2} ⊆ P, where x 1 y and y 2 x.
Since all alternatives are &-incomparable, there are no P -chains. Condi-
tions (?)–(??) in the characterisation theorem (p. 9) are therefore (vacuously)
satisfied by any preference. So by the characterisation theorem, every prefer-
ence is a minimum upper bound of P .
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The message of Example 4 is that preferences that disagree only on
&-incomparable pairs of alternatives S-dominate each other, leading to
multiplicity of minimum upper bounds for some sets of preferences. The
solution is to rule out &-incomparability:
Uniqueness proposition. The following are equivalent:
(1) Every set of preferences has at most one minimum upper bound.
(2) Every set of preferences has exactly one minimum upper bound.
(3) & is complete.
A strengthening of this result involving maximum lower bounds is given
in appendix F. The stronger result implies that (P, S) is a complete lattice
iff it is a lattice iff & is complete.
Proof that (3) implies (2). Suppose that & is complete, and fix a set P ⊆ P .
Since completeness implies crown- and diamond-freeness, P has at least one
minimum upper bound by the existence theorem (p. 15).
To show uniqueness, let ′,′′ ∈ P be minimum upper bounds of P ⊆ P .
Then by the characterisation theorem (p. 9), ′ and ′′ must agree on all
&-comparable pairs of alternatives. Since & is complete, it follows that ′
and ′′ agree on all pairs of alternatives, i.e. that they are identical. 
It is immediate that (2) implies (1). The final implication requires the
following lemma, proved in appendix E.
Lemma 4. Let x, y ∈ X be &-incomparable. Then any set P ⊆ P has upper
bounds ′,′′ ∈ P such that x ′ y and y ′′ x.
Proof that (1) implies (3). We prove the contra-positive. Suppose that & is
incomplete, so that some x, y ∈ X are &-incomparable; we seek a P ⊆ P
with multiple upper bounds. By Lemma 4, such a P can be found. (Indeed,
every P ⊆ P has multiple upper bounds.) 
Application to politically correct discourse (continued). Agents need
not express consensus: they may well express views that are distinct minimum
upper bounds of their true views P = {1,2}. In Example 4, political
correctness makes no demands, so agents express their differing true views.
The uniqueness proposition tells us that any two agents P = {1,2}
will express consensus if, and only if, & is complete. In other words, self-
censorship fully extinguishes expressions of differing views only when political
correctness fully specifies how social issues ought to be ranked.
17
We have seen examples of issues for which political correctness & is
plausibly incomplete. For some issues, though, completeness may obtain: an
example is economic justice for women (x), for men (y) and for dogs (z),
where x & y & z. Conversations on this issue will lead any pair of agents to
express concordant views, even if they actually disagree.
3 Application to monotone comparative statics
In this section, we extend the theory of monotone comparative statics16 in two
directions. First, in §3.2, we consider comparative statics for the consensus:
under what circumstances does the set of alternatives that every individual
in a group P ⊆ P considers optimal increase? Second, in §3.3, we consider
misspecification-robust comparative statics: under what circumstances can
an analyst who knows only that the agent’s preference lies in a set P ⊆ P
conclude that optimal alternatives will increase?
Our Proposition 1 (§3.2) establishes that when P increases in the strong
set order, so does the consensus. Our Proposition 2 (§3.3) similarly shows
that when P increases in the alternative set order (a natural weakening of
the strong set order), so does the set of possibly-optimal alternatives. Both
proofs hinge on the existence theorem.
3.1 The canonical theory
We begin with a brief recap of the canonical theory of monotone comparative
statics. An agent chooses an alternative x from a set X ⊆ R ordered by
the usual inequality ≥. The agent chooses optimally with respect to her
preference  ∈ P.17 Denote by X() the (possibly empty) set of optimal
alternatives for preference  ∈ P:
X() := {x ∈ X : x  y for every y ∈ X} .
Definition 5. Consider a lattice (A,≥) and two subsets A,B ⊆ A. A
dominates B in the (≥-induced) strong set order iff for any a ∈ A and b ∈ B,
we have a ∨ b ∈ A and a ∧ b ∈ B.
Note well that A dominates B in the strong set order whenever either
set is empty.
16See Topkis (1978), Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and LiCalzi and Veinott (1992).
17This setting is more frequently studied using a utility representation rather than the
preference itself, but this makes no material difference.
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MCS theorem.18 Let ,′ ∈ P be preferences. If ′ S , then X(′)
dominates X() in the (≥-induced) strong set order.
In other words, when the agent’s preference increases in the sense of
single-crossing dominance S, the set of optimal alternatives increases in the
sense of the strong set order.
Remark 2. There is a variant of the MCS theorem that applies whenever
(X ,&) is a lattice. This added generality is not useful for our purposes
because in order to apply the existence theorem, we shall require that &
be crown- and diamond-free, and the only diamond-free lattices are chains
(totally ordered sets).19 It is therefore essentially without loss of generality
to assume that X is a subset of R, ordered by inequality ≥.20
3.2 Comparative statics for the consensus
Consider a problem in which there is a group of agents, each with a preference
 ∈ P. Write P ⊆ P for the set of preferences in the group. The consensus
C(P ) is the set of alternatives that every individual in the group finds
optimal:
C(P ) :=
⋂
∈P
X().
Since ≥ is complete, (P, S) is a lattice by the uniqueness proposition (p.
17). We may therefore use the (S-induced) strong set order to compare sets
of preferences.
Proposition 1 (consensus comparative statics). Let X be a subset of R
ordered by inequality ≥, and let P, P ′ ⊆ P be sets of preferences. If P ′
dominates P in the (S-induced) strong set order, then C(P ′) dominates
C(P ) in the (≥-induced) strong set order.
In other words, when agents’ preferences shift up in the sense of the
strong set order, so does the consensus. Note that it may be that either C(P )
or C(P ′) is empty, in which case the conclusion holds automatically.
Proof. Fix P, P ′ ⊆ P such that P ′ dominates P in the S-induced strong
set order. The conclusion is immediate if either C(P ) or C(P ′) is empty, so
suppose not. Take x ∈ C(P ) and x′ ∈ C(P ′); we must show that x ∧ x′ lies
18Milgrom and Shannon (1994), LiCalzi and Veinott (1992).
19See footnote 14 (p. 15).
20It is only ‘essentially’ without loss because there are chains (X ,&) that cannot be
embedded in (R,≥) because the cardinality of X exceeds that of R.
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in C(P ) and that x∨ x′ lies in C(P ′). We will prove the former; the proof of
the latter is similar.
Take any  ∈ P and ′ ∈ P ′. Since the order ≥ on X is complete, the set
{,′} possesses a join ? by the uniqueness proposition (p. 17). Since P ′
dominates P in the S-induced strong set order, the join ? lies in P ′. Because
? S ′, the MCS theorem implies that X(?) dominates X() in the ≥-
induced strong set order. Since x ∈ C(P ) ⊆ X() and x′ ∈ C(P ′) ⊆ X(?),
it follows that x ∧ x′ ∈ X(). Since  ∈ P was arbitrary, this shows that
x ∧ x′ ∈ C(P ). 
Proposition 1 can be used to study comparative statics for social choice.
A social choice function (SCF) is a map φ : 2P \ {∅} → X that picks an
alternative for each non-empty set of preferences.21 A SCF φ is monotone iff
φ(P ′) ≥ φ(P ) whenever P ′ dominates P in the (S-induced) strong set order,
and respects unanimity iff φ(P ) ∈ C(P ) whenever the latter is non-empty.
Corollary 1. Let X ⊆ R be compact. Then there exists a monotone SCF
that respects unanimity.
The (not entirely trivial) proof is in appendix G.
3.3 Misspecification-robust comparative statics
Suppose that an analyst wishes to obtain a comparative statics conclusion,
but is unsure of the agent’s preference. In particular, she knows only that
the agent’s preference initially lies in P ⊆ P, and that it subsequently lies
in P ′ ⊆ P. Under what circumstances can she obtain a comparative statics
conclusion that is robust to misspecification of the agent’s preference?
Write
X(P ) :=
⋃
∈P
X()
for the set possibly-optimal alternatives, given that the agent has some
preference in P . The analyst wishes to infer that when P increases in a
suitable sense, X(P ) also increases in a suitable sense. The following variant
of the strong set order turns out to be appropriate:
Definition 6. Consider a lattice (A,≥) and two subsets A,B ⊆ A. A
dominates B in the (≥-induced) alternative set order iff for any a ∈ A and
b ∈ B, there is an a′ ∈ A such that a′ ≥ a ∨ b and a b′ ∈ B such that
a ∧ b ≥ b′.
21It is more typical to have a SCF map profiles of preferences into alternatives, but the
distinction is immaterial for our purposes.
20
The alternative set order is formally weaker than the strong set order,
but intuitively captures the same notion of ‘larger’.
Proposition 2 (misspecification-robust comparative statics). Let X be a
subset of R ordered by inequality ≥, and let P, P ′ ⊆ P be non-empty sets
of preferences such that X() is non-empty for every  ∈ P ∪ P ′. If P ′
dominates P in the (S-induced) alternative set order, then X(P ′) dominates
X(P ) in the (≥-induced) alternative set order.
The assertion becomes false if ‘alternative’ is replaced with ‘strong’. The
hypothesis that the argmaxes X() are non-empty is unfortunately essential,
as we show by example in appendix J. It can be ensured by standard sufficient
conditions.22
Proof. Fix P, P ′ ⊆ P such that P ′ dominates P in the S-induced alternative
set order. Take x ∈ X(P ) and x′ ∈ X(P ′). We will show that there is a
y′ ≥ x ∨ x′ that lies in X(P ′) and a y ≤ x ∧ x′ that lies in X(P ).
By hypothesis, there are preferences  ∈ P and ′ ∈ P ′ such that
x ∈ X() and x′ ∈ X(′). Since the order ≥ on X is complete, these
preferences possess a minimum upper bound  ∨′ and a maximum lower
bound ∧′ by the uniqueness proposition (p. 17). Since P ′ dominates P in
the S-induced alternative set order, there is a ? ∈ P ′ such that ? S (∨′)
and a ? ∈ P such that ( ∧′) S ?.
Since
? S ( ∨′) S  S ( ∧′) S ? and similarly ? S ′ S ?, 23
the MCS theorem yields
X(?) w X() w X(?) and X(?) w X(′) w X(?),
where w denotes the ≥-induced strong set order on subsets of X . It follows
that
X(?) w X() ∨X(′) and X() ∧X(′) w X(?),
where
X() ∨X(′) := {y ∨ y′ : y ∈ X() and y′ ∈ X(′)} ,
and X() ∧X(′) is defined analogously.
22For example, finiteness of X , compactness of X plus a continuity hypothesis, or the
purely order-theoretic sufficient conditions of Milgrom and Shannon (1994, Theorem A.4).
23We are relying on the fact that S is transitive.
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Since X(?) is non-empty by hypothesis, there is a x? ∈ X(?). Since
X(?) w X()∨X(′), y′ := x?∨ (x∨x′) lies in X(?), and hence in X(P ′)
since ? ∈ P ′. Clearly y′ ≥ x ∨ x′, as required.
Similarly, we may choose x? ∈ X(?), set y := x?∧ (x∧x′), and conclude
that y lies in X(?) ⊆ X(P ), and that x ∧ x′ ≥ y. 
4 Application to ambiguity- and risk-aversion
In this section, we apply our results to ambiguity-aversion,24 and in partic-
ular to the comparison of preferences according to ‘more ambiguity-averse
than’. We introduce and study a general class of maxmin preferences, and
characterise this class in terms of minimum upper bounds.
In §4.2, we introduce (generalised) maxmin preferences, which (greatly)
generalise maxmin expected utility (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989). In §4.3, we
use our theorems to prove that maxmin preferences may be characterised
as minimum upper bounds with respect to ‘more ambiguity-averse than’. In
§4.4, we adapt the argument to preferences over lotteries.
4.1 Environment
The setting is the Savage (1954) framework, with money prizes as con-
sequences. There is a set Ω of states of the world and a set Π ⊆ R of
monetary prizes.25 Let X be an arbitrary set of acts, meaning functions
Ω → Π,26 with typical elements X,Y ∈ X . Write C ⊆ X for subset of
constant acts, meaning those that always lead to the same prize. Typical
constant acts are denoted by C,D ∈ C. By a standard abuse of notation, we
identify each constant act C ∈ C with the prize (element of Π ⊆ R) at which
it is constant. Assume for that C (viewed as a subset of R) is closed.
Let P be the set of all preferences over X . A preference is called more
ambiguity-averse than another iff whenever the latter prefers a constant act,
the former does, too:
Definition 7. For two preferences ,′ ∈ P, we say that ′ is more
ambiguity-averse than  iff for an act X ∈ X and a constant act C ∈ C,
C () X implies C ′(′) X.
24See Ellsberg (1965), Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Klibanoff,
Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) and Cerreia-
Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Montrucchio (2011).
25The analysis is easily extended to allow for objective lotteries over monetary prizes.
26We do not restrict attention to acts with finite co-domain.
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This definition is standard—see Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) and
Epstein (1999).27 It is inspired by Yaari’s (1969) definition of ‘more risk-averse
than’, which we will study in §4.4.
Say that a preference  ∈ P is monotone iff it likes money: for any pair
of constant acts C,D ∈ C, we have C  D iff C ≥ D. A certainty equivalent
for  ∈ P of an act X ∈ X is a constant act C ∈ C such that X  C  X.
A preference is called solvable iff it has a certainty equivalent for every act.28
Let P ′ ⊆ P denote the set of monotone and solvable preferences over X .
Write c(, X) for the (by monotonicity, unique) certainty equivalent of an
act X ∈ X according to a preference  ∈ P ′.
A function U : X → R ordinally represents a preference  ∈ P iff for
any acts X,Y ∈ X , we have X  Y iff U(X) ≥ U(Y ). Given a preference
 ∈ P, a strictly increasing (utility) function u : Π→ R and a probability
measure (a belief) µ on Ω, we say that (u, µ) is a subjective expected utility
(SEU) representation of  iff
X 7→
∫
Ω
(u ◦X) dµ
ordinally represents .29  is called a SEU preference iff such a pair (u, µ)
can be found.
A preference  ∈ P is called probabilistically sophisticated iff it can
be viewed as arising from a decision-maker with a belief µ ∈ ∆(Ω) about
the state who cares about an act X solely through the (subjective) lottery
over prizes µ ◦X−1 that it induces.30 Formally,  ∈ P is probabilistically
sophisticated iff there exists a probability measure µ ∈ ∆(Ω) and a preference
L over monetary lotteries ∆(Π) such that
for acts X,Y ∈ X , X  Y iff µ ◦X−1 L µ ◦ Y −1.
Any SEU preference is probabilistically sophisticated, but the converse is
false.
27Our analysis carries over to the case where, in the sprit of Epstein (1999), C is the set
of all ‘unambiguous’ acts, including but not necessarily limited to constant acts.
28In the sequel, it is natural (though not necessary) to assume that C contains every
constant function Ω→ Π.
29We shall not be careful about what exactly is meant by the integral ‘
∫
’, since this
detail is irrelevant for our results.
30The pushforward measure µ ◦X−1 is the measure on Π defined by
(
µ ◦X−1
)
(A) :=
µ({ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) ∈ A}) for each (measurable) A ⊆ Π.
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4.2 Generalised maxmin preferences
We are concerned with preferences over acts that admit a maxmin represent-
ation of a general sort:
Definition 8. A set P ⊆ P ′ of monotone and solvable preferences is a
(generalised) maxmin representation of a preference ? ∈ P iff
X 7→ inf
∈P
c(, X)
ordinally represents ?, where ‘inf’ is the ordinary infimum over real numbers.
Intuitively, such a decision-maker is unsure which preference  ∈ P
to evaluate acts according to, so cautiously values acts at their smallest
certainty equivalent among  ∈ P . An alternative intepretation is that there
is a group of agents with preferences P , and that collective decisions are
made according to the ‘Rawlsian’ maxmin criterion.
A special case is a maxmin expected utility representation: this is a
maxmin representation P ⊆ P ′ consisting entirely of SEU preferences that
have the same utility function, i.e. there exists a u : Π→ R such that every
preference  ∈ P has a SEU representation (u, µ) for some µ ∈ ∆(Ω).31
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) introduced maxmin expected utility preferences,
and gave axioms in the Anscombe–Aumann (1963) framework. Casadesus-
Masanell, Klibanoff and Özdenören (2000) gave axioms in the Savage setting.
Another special case is subjective cautious expected utility, where P
is a set of SEU preferences with the same belief µ ∈ ∆(Ω). In this case,
the decision-maker is probabilistically sophisticated, but her implicit pref-
erence L over monetary lotteries has the ‘cautious expected utility’ form
axiomatised by Cerreia-Vioglio, Dillenberger and Ortoleva (2015).32
31To see explicitly that this is equivalent to the usual definition of maxmin expected
utility, observe first that u must be strictly increasing since the preferences in P are
monotone. On our definition, ? is ordinally represented by
X 7→ inf
∈P
c(, X) = inf
∈P
u−1
(∫
Ω
(u ◦X)dµ
)
= u−1
(
inf
∈P
∫
Ω
(u ◦X)dµ
)
,
which is a strictly increasing transformation of X 7→ inf∈P
∫
Ω(u ◦X)dµ.32In this case, ? is ordinally represented by
X 7→ inf
∈P
u−1
(∫
Ω
(u ◦X)dµ
)
= inf
∈P
u−1
(∫
Ω
ud
(
µ ◦X−1
))
.
The implicit preference L over monetary lotteries q ∈ ∆(Π) therefore admits the cautious
expected utility representation q 7→ inf∈P u−1
(∫
Ω udq
)
.
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The entire class of maxmin preference is too broad to put substantial
restrictions on behaviour:
Observation 1 (maxmin axiomatisation). For a preference ? ∈ P, the
following are equivalent:
(1) ? is monotone and solvable.
(2) ? admits a maxmin representation.
Proof. Recall that by definition, a maxmin representation is a set P ⊆ P ′ of
monotone and solvable preferences. It is easily verified that a preference that
admits a maxmin representation must itself be monotone, and solvability
follows since C (as a subset of R) is closed. For the converse, suppose that ?
is monotone and solvable; then P := {?} is a maxmin representation. 
Interesting behaviour arises, however, when P is restricted beyond merely
monotonicity and solvability, but not so severely as to yield maxmin expected
utility or subjective cautious expected utility. For instance:
Example 5. Consider a decision-maker who has maxmin expected utility
(MEU) preferences, but who faces ‘background risk’ in the form of uncertain
wealth W : Ω→ Π. Her preference is ordinally represented by
X 7→ inf
∈P
∫
Ω
(u ◦ [X +W ])dµ,33
where P ⊆ P ′ is a MEU representation, i.e. a set of SEU preferences that
share the same (strictly increasing) risk attitude u : Π → R, but differ in
their beliefs µ on Ω. We call this MEU with background risk (MEU-BR).
The MEU-BR class is contained in the (generalised) maxmin class—simply
observe that MEU-BR preferences satisfy monotonicity and solvability, and
apply Observation 1. In fact, the containment is strict: MEU-BR preferences
satisfy behavioural axioms in addition to monotonicity and solvability. For
example, any MEU-BR preference ? clearly satisfies state-wise monotonicity:
if X,Y ∈ X are such that X(ω) ≥ Y (ω) for every ω ∈ Ω, then X ? Y .
On the other hand, MEU-BR strictly extends the MEU model, allowing for
choice behaviour that the latter cannot rationalise. For example, while MEU
preferences satisfy a form of independence called ordered A-act-independence
(Casadesus-Masanell et al., 2000), MEU-BR preferences need not.34
33Assume that Π is closed under addition, so that X(ω) +W (ω) lies in Π for each ω ∈ Ω.
34A counter-example is as follows (see Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2000) for definitions).
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4.3 Characterisation of maxmin preferences
Our theorems permit us to characterise maxmin preferences as precisely
minimum upper bounds with respect to ‘more ambiguity-averse than’:
Proposition 3 (maxmin characterisation). For a preference ? ∈ P and a
set P ⊆ P ′ of monotone and solvable preferences over acts, the following are
equivalent:
(1) P is a maxmin representation of ?.
(2) ? is a minimum upper bound of P with respect to ‘more ambiguity-
averse than’.
Proposition 3 furnishes an intuitive way to interpret maxmin preferences.
To wit, a preference with maxmin representation P is precisely one that is
more ambiguity-averse than any preference in P , but no more ambiguity-
averse than that.
Proposition 3 also delivers comparative statics for ambiguity-aversion:
Corollary 2 (comparative statics). Let ,′ ∈ P admit maxmin represent-
ations P, P ′ ⊆ P ′. If P ′ contains P , or if P ′ dominates P in the strong set
order,35 then ′ is more ambiguity-averse than .
Another consequence of Proposition 3 is that every set P ⊆ P ′ of mono-
tone and solvable preferences possesses exactly one minimum upper bound
with respect to ‘more ambiguity-averse than’. The existence of minimum
upper bounds can actually be proved directly using the existence theorem,
and does not require solvability. In particular, define a binary relation & on X
by X & Y iff either (i) X = Y , or (ii) X is constant and Y is not, or (iii) X,Y
are constant and X > Y . For any pair ,′ ∈ P of monotone preferences,
′ is more ambiguity-averse than  iff ′ dominates  in the single-crossing
relation induced by &. It is trivial that & is crown- and diamond-free; we
may therefore invoke the existence theorem.
Let Π = R and Ω = {0, 1}. The MEU-BR representation consists of wealth W (ω) = ω
and two SEU representations (u, µ0) and (u, µ1), where u is the identity and µω assigns
probability 1 to state ω. Observe that there are two ordered non-null and non-universal
events, {0} and {1}; fix one, A = {ω?}. Any acts X,Y, Z,X ′, Y ′ with the following
properties violate part (i) of A-act-independence: V (ω?) > V (1− ω?) for V ∈ {X,Y, Z},
and X(ω) > Y (ω) ≥ Z(ω) + 1 and X ′(ω) = Y ′(ω) = Z(ω) + ω? for ω ∈ {1, 2}.
35The strong set order was defined in §3.1 (p. 18).
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Proof of Proposition 3. Fix a set P ⊆ P ′ of monotone and solvable prefer-
ences. Let & be the crown- and diamond-free partial order defined in the
previous paragraph.
Remark that P -chains have a simple form. There is a strict P -chain
between any distinct pair of constant acts because every preference in P is
monotone. There are no P -chains between non-constant acts, since there are
no &-monotone sequences between them. Finally, there is a (strict) P -chain
from a constant act C to a non-constant act X iff C () X for some  ∈ P .
We need therefore only consider P -chains of length 2 from a constant act
to a non-constant one. So fix a constant C ∈ C and a non-constant X ∈ X \C.
(1) implies (2): Suppose that P is a maxmin representation of ? ∈ P.
We will show that ? is a minimum upper bound of P by establishing that
it satisfies conditions (?)–(??) in the characterisation theorem (p. 9).
Suppose that there is a (strict) P -chain from C to X, which we argued
implies that C () X for some  ∈ P . Then c(, C) ≥(>) c(, X) for
some  ∈ P , and since every preference agrees on the certainty equivalent of
a constant act, it follows that
inf
∈P
c(, C) ≥(>) inf
∈P
c(, X).
Thus C ?(?) X since P is a maxmin representation of ?.
Suppose that there is no (strict) P -chain from C to X: C () X for
every  ∈ P . Then c(, C) <(≤) c(, X) for every  ∈ P , so
inf
∈P
c(, C) <(≤) inf
∈P
c(, X).
Since P is a maxmin representation of ?, it follows that C ?(?) X.
(2) implies (1): Let ? ∈ P be a minimum upper bound of P . We wish
to show that P is a maxmin representation of ?.
Suppose that C ?(?) X. Then by the characterisation theorem, there
is a (strict) P -chain from C to X, which we argued means that C () X
for some  ∈ P , or equivalently c(, C) ≥(>) c(, X) for some  ∈ P . Since
all preferences agree on the certainty equivalent of a constant act, it follows
that
inf
∈P
c(, C) ≥(>) inf
∈P
c(, X).
Suppose that X ?(?) C, or equivalently C ?(?) X. Then by the
characterisation theorem, there is no (strict) P -chain from C to X. Therefore
c(, C) <(≤) c(, X) for every  ∈ P , so
inf
∈P
c(, C) <(≤) inf
∈P
c(, X). 
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Savage (§4.1–4.3) von Neumann–Morgenstern (§4.4)
act lottery
constant act degenerate lottery
certainty equivalent certainty equivalent
more ambiguity-averse than more risk-averse than
maxmin representation cautious representation
Table 1 – Relabelling of terms for §4.4.
4.4 Risk-aversion and caution
In this section, we carry our results over to preferences over monetary
lotteries in the von Neumann–Morgenstern (1947) framework. In brief, we
relabel terms according to Table 1, and thence obtain a characterisation of
cautious preferences as precisely minimum upper bounds with respect to
‘more risk-averse than’.
There is a set Π ⊆ R of monetary prizes and a set X of lotteries
(probability distributions) over prizes. A degenerate lottery, C ∈ C ⊆ X , is
one that pays out some prize x ∈ Π with probability one. As is standard, we
identify a degenerate lottery with the prize it pays. We write P for the set
of all preferences over X . A function u : Π→ R is called an expected utility
(EU) representation of  ∈ P iff X 7→ ∫Π udX ordinally represents .
Comparative risk-aversion is standardly defined as follows (Yaari, 1969):
Definition 9. For two preferences ,′ ∈ P, we say that ′ is more risk-
averse than  iff for a lottery X ∈ X and a degenerate lottery C ∈ C,
C () X implies C ′(′) X.
A preference  ∈ P is monotone iff for any pair of degenerate lotteries
C,D ∈ C, we have C  D iff C ≥ D. A certainty equivalent for  ∈ P of
a lottery X ∈ X is a degenerate lottery C ∈ C such that X  C  X. Let
P ′ ⊆ P be all monotone and solvable preferences, and write c(, X) for their
certainty equivalents.
Definition 10. A set P ⊆ P ′ of monotone and solvable preferences is a
cautious representation of a preference ? ∈ P iff
X 7→ inf
∈P
c(, X)
ordinally represents ?, where ‘inf’ is the ordinary infimum over real numbers.
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The special case in which P ⊆ P ′ contains only EU preferences is called
(objective) cautious expected utility; such preferences have been axiomatised
by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015). Cautious representations are much more
general than this, however: all (and only) monotone and solvable preferences
admit a cautious representation.
Corollary 3 (caution characterisation). For a preference ? ∈ P and a set
P ⊆ P ′ of monotone and solvable preferences over lotteries, the following are
equivalent:
(1) P is a cautious representation of ?.
(2) ? is a minimum upper bound of P with respect to ‘more risk-averse
than’.
Corollary 3 implies comparative statics along the lines of Corollary 2, as
well as the existence and uniqueness of minimum upper bounds of sets of
monotone and solvable preferences. Existence does not require solvability.
5 Application to social choice
In this section, we apply our theorems to social choice in the presence of
normative constraints that require unanimity in order for certain alternatives
to be ranked above others. We ask what normative constraints are compatible
with a suitable Pareto property.
Our (im)possibility theorem (§5.3) provides the necessary and sufficient
condition on a normative constraint for there to exist a social welfare function
that satisfies it as well as the Pareto criterion. Since the condition is strong,
this can be viewed as an impossibility result in the spirit of Sen’s (1970)
‘impossibility of a Paretian liberal’; we discuss this relationship in §5.4. But
our result also has an encouraging side: we exhibit some natural normative
constraints which are compatible with the Pareto property.
5.1 Environment
There is a society composed of n individuals, each with a preference over a
set X of social alternatives. For certain pairs x, y ∈ X , it is acceptable for
society to rank y (strictly) above x only if all members of society consent;
we write x & y when this is the case. We assume that & is a partial order
(in particular, transitive).
For example, it may be that x & y if alternative involves more surveillance
or social control than does x. Alternatively, consider a community deciding
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what amenities to provide at public expense. If alternative x differs from y in
adding a luxury such as a swimming pool or gym, then it may be normatively
acceptable for the community to favour y over x only if every individual
consents, i.e. x & y. Or it could be that & reflects the status quo:
Example 6. Suppose that there are old alternatives Y and new alternatives
Z, so that X = Y ∪ Z. In the past, when only alternatives Y were available,
option x0 ∈ Y was chosen. It is acceptable for society to depart from this
status quo by ranking some y ∈ Y above x0 only with the consent of all
individuals: in other words, x0 & y for every other y ∈ Y.
Precedent does not constrain how previously-unchosen alternatives y, y′ ∈
Y \ {x0} are ranked, nor does it have anything to say about new alternatives
z ∈ Z. Formally, any alternatives y, y′ ∈ Y \ {x0} are &-incomparable, and
each z ∈ Z is &-incomparable to every other alternative.
This fully specifies the partial order &. It looks like this:
z z′
x0
y y′ y′′
A social welfare function (SWF) is a map f : Pn → P that produces
a social preference for any profile pi ∈ Pn of individual preferences. This
specification encodes the assumptions of transitivity (social preference must
be transitive) and unrestricted domain (any profile of individual preferences
is possible).
Definition 11. A SWF f respects justified objections iff for any profile
pi = (1, . . . ,n) and alternatives x & y, x f(pi) y (and not y f(pi) x)
whenever x i(i) y for some individual i.
Observe that a SWF f respects justified objections precisely if f(pi)
is an upper bound of pi for every profile pi of preferences.36 By the UB
characterisation lemma (p. 8), this means precisely that for x & y, x f(pi) y
(and not y f(pi) x) whenever there is a (strict) pi-chain from x to y.
A SWF f respects unanimity (or ‘is Pareto’) iff for any profile pi =
(1, . . . ,n), whenever x i(i) y for every individual i, we have x f(pi) y
(and not y f(pi) x). Unsurprisingly, respect for unanimity typically clashes
with respect for justified objections:
36We abuse notation throughout by identifying the profile pi = (1, . . . ,n) with the
set P :=
⋃n
i=1{i} of preferences in it.
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Example 7. Let X = {x, y, z} with x > y > z, and let pi = (1,2), where
z 1 x 1 y and y 2 z 2 x. If f is a SWF that respects justified objections,
then f(pi) must rank x above y since x & y and x 1 y. f(pi) must similarly
rank y above z, and thus rank x above z by transitivity. But then f fails to
respect unanimity, since z is unanimously strictly preferred to x.
Unconditional respect for unanimity is therefore too demanding in the
presence of normative constraints. It is more appropriate to ask that unan-
imity be respected only when this does not obviously conflict with respect
for justified objections:
Definition 12. A SWF f conditionally respects unanimity iff for any profile
pi = (1, . . . ,n), whenever x i(i) y for every individual i and there is no
strict pi-chain (no pi-chain) from y to x, we have x f(pi) y (and not y f(pi) x).
Call a SWF acceptable iff it respects justified objections and conditionally
respects unanimity.
5.2 Acceptable SWFs need not exist
Since conditional respect for unanimity is designed to be compatible with
respect for justified objections, it may appear that acceptable SWFs are
guaranteed to exist. We will now see that this intuition is incorrect.
Lemma 5 (only joins are acceptable). If f is acceptable, then f(pi) is a
minimum upper bound of pi for every profile pi ∈ Pn.
It follows by the existence theorem (p. 15) that a necessary condition for
the existence of an acceptable SWF is that & be crown- and diamond-free.
For instance, the preferences in Example 2 (p. 11) and in Example 3 (p. 14)
cannot be aggregated in an acceptable way.
Proof. Suppose that f is acceptable, and fix a profile pi ∈ Pn. Respect for
justified objections requires that f(pi) be an upper bound of pi.
To see that conditional respect for unanimity requires minimumhood,
suppose toward a contradiction that there is another upper bound ′ of pi
such that ′ 6S f(pi). Then there are alternatives x, y ∈ X with x & y such
that y is (strictly) unanimously preferred to x and y ′(′) x, but x f(pi) y
(and not y f(pi) x). Since ′ is an upper bound of pi, there cannot be a (strict)
pi-chain from x to y. Hence f(pi) fails to conditionally respect unanimity, so
is unacceptable—a contradiction. 
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Crown- and diamond-freeness of & is not sufficient for acceptable prefer-
ence aggregation, however:
Example 1 (continued). Recall the details from p. 7. & is crown- and
diamond-free by inspection.
Let there be two individuals n = 2, and let f be a SWF; we will show
that f cannot be acceptable. Consider pi = (1,2), where 1 and 2 are as
given previously (p. 7). Write ? := f(pi) for the social preference according
to f .
By Lemma 5, a necessary condition for f to be acceptable is that ? be
a minimum upper bound of pi. We saw (p. 9) that this requires precisely that
w ? x ? y ? z.
But then f fails to conditionally respect unanimity: z is unanimously strictly
preferred to w, and there is no P -chain from w to z, and yet f(pi) = ?
ranks w above z.
5.3 (Im)possibility theorem
We have shown that crown- and diamond-freeness is necessary, but not
sufficient, for the existence of an acceptable SWF. It can be shown that
completeness is sufficient but not necessary. Our (im)possibility theorem
provides the necessary and sufficient condition: (X ,&) must be either a fork
or a shattered fork.
Definition 13. Let ≥ be a binary relation on a set A. An element a ∈ A is
isolated iff it is ≥-incomparable to every other element of A. A set A ⊆ A is
an upward (downard) fork head iff it has a minimum (maximum) element
a ∈ A and A \ {a} is an anti-chain, and simply a fork head iff it is either an
upward or a downward fork head.
The poset (A,≥) is an up-fork (down-fork) iff A can be partitioned as
A = A ∪ {a} ∪ B where A ∪ {a} is an upward (downward) fork head with
minimum (maximum) element a and {a} ∪ B is a chain with maximum
(minimum) element a, and simply a fork iff it is an up-fork or a down-fork.
The poset (A,≥) is a shattered fork iff A can be partitioned as A = A∪B,
where A is a fork head and each b ∈ B is isolated.
This definition is illustrated in Figure 2. Observe that (X ,&) being a fork
or shattered fork implies that & is crown- and diamond-free, and is implied
by completeness of &. Since the converse implications do not hold, this
property is strictly in-between the conditions for existence and for uniqueness
of minimum upper bounds.
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a1
a2
a3
b1 b2 b3
(a) Up-fork.
a1 a2a3
b1 b2 b3
(b) Shattered fork.
a1
a2
a3
b1 b2 b3
(c) Down-fork.
a1 a2
a3
b1 b2 b3
(d) Shattered fork.
Figure 2 – Transitive reductions of some forks and shattered forks.
(Im)possibility theorem. The following are equivalent:
(1) There exists an acceptable SWF.
(2) (X ,&) is either a fork or a shattered fork.
The proof is in appendix H. There, we also provide a ‘forbidden subposet’
variant of the (im)possibility theorem according to which the existence of an
acceptable SWF is equivalent to & being free of various subposets (including,
but not limited to, crowns and diamonds). Note that as a special case, there
exists an acceptable SWF whenever there are three or fewer alternatives.
The (im)possibility theorem bears both good news and bad. On the one
hand, acceptable aggregation of preferences is impossible whenever (X ,&) is
anything other than a fork or shattered fork, a stringent condition. On the
other hand, if (X ,&) is a fork or shattered fork, then acceptable aggregation
is possible.
It is easy to come up with examples in which the normative constraint is
not a fork or shattered fork. In Examples 2 and 3, & fails to be crown- and
diamond-free, so (X ,&) is certainly not a fork or shattered fork. Further:
Example 1 (continued). Although & is crown- and diamond-free, (X ,&) is
neither a fork nor a shattered fork by inspection. We saw that no acceptable
SWF exists.
But equally, there are environments in which the fork-or-shattered-fork
condition plausibly holds:
Example 6 (continued). By inspection, the normative constraint & is a
shattered (down-)fork. It follows by the (im)possibility theorem that there is
an acceptable SWF.
Consider a variant in which there is a status quo ranking of the old
alternatives Y , and that the normative constraint requires unanimous consent
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to overturn any part of the status quo ranking. That is, Y is a chain in &.
Suppose further that unanimous consent is needed to rank a new alternative
z ∈ Z above any old alternative y ∈ Y, so that y & z. (This is a very
conservative society!) Then (X ,&) is a (down-)fork, so an acceptable SWF
exists by the (im)possibility theorem.
5.4 Related literature
Our (im)possibility result can be thought of as complementary to Sen’s (1970)
‘impossibility of a Paretian liberal’. Sen defines ‘minimal liberalism’ as follows:
there exist two individuals i 6= j and four distinct alternatives xi, yi, xj , yj
such that individual i (j) dictates the social preference on xi, yi (xj , yj). The
idea is that xi and yi differ only in respects relevant only to individual i
(such as the colour of i’s wallpaper), and that such personal decisions should
be devolved to the individual in a liberal society. Sen’s theorem states that,
when there are n ≥ 2 individuals and |X | ≥ 4 alternatives, there exists no
SWF that respects unanimity and minimal liberalism.
Sen’s notion of liberalism is sensible when social alternatives specify
personal matters (such as wallpaper colour). It is inappropriate for environ-
ments, such as surveillance, in which social alternatives are not such complete
descriptions of the state of society.37 In such contexts, our notion of respect
for justified objections is a more reasonable notion of liberalism, and our
(im)possibility theorem provides a somewhat more encouraging conclusion
about the compatibility of liberalism with respect for unanimity.
Arrow’s (1950, 1951, 1963) impossibility theorem similarly shows that,
for n ≥ 2 and |X | ≥ 3, there is no SWF that respects unanimity, inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and non-dictatorship. Although we
didn’t demand non-dictatorship, it actually follows from respect for justified
objections whenever & is non-trivial. Like Sen, we dispense with IIA.
A key formal difference between our requirements and those of Sen
and Arrow is that theirs restrict how society aggregates preferences across
preference profiles (minimal liberalism for Sen, IIA and non-dictatorship for
Arrow). By contrast, our notion of acceptability only requires satisfactory
preference aggregation for each profile, separately.
37In the surveillance example, Sen’s notion of liberalism requires that at least two
individuals have some dictatorial power over some aspects of state surveillance!
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Appendices
A Standard definitions
This appendix collects definitions of standard order-theoretic concepts used
in this paper. Let A be a non-empty set, and ≥ a binary relation on it.
For a, b ∈ A, we write a  b iff it is not the case that b ≥ a, and a > b iff
a ≥ b and a  b. We say that a, b ∈ A are ≥-comparable iff either a ≥ b or
b ≥ a.
≥ is complete iff every pair a, b ∈ A is ≥-comparable, transitive iff
a ≥ b ≥ c implies a ≥ c for a, b, c ∈ A, reflexive iff a ≥ a for any a ∈ A, and
anti-symmetric iff a ≥ b ≥ a implies a = b for a, b ∈ A. ≥ is a partial order
iff it is transitive, reflexive and anti-symmetric; (A,≥) is then called a poset
(partially ordered set).
A subset A ⊆ A is called a ≥-chain iff all of its elements are ≥-comparable
to each other,38 and an ≥-anti-chain iff none of of its elements are ≥-
comparable to each other.
Given a set A ⊆ A, an element a ∈ A is ≥-minimal in A iff there is no
b ∈ A such that a ≥ b  a,39 and a ≥-minimum in A iff b ≥ a for every
b ∈ A. Maximal and maximum elements are defined analogously.
An element b ∈ A is a ≥-upper bound of a set A ⊆ A iff b ≥ a for each
a ∈ A, and a ≥-minimum ≥-upper bound (or ≥-join, or ≥-supremum) iff
in addition it is a ≥-minimum of the set of ≥-upper bounds of A. ≥-lower
bounds and ≥-maximum ≥-lower bounds (or ≥-meets, or ≥-infima) are
defined analogously. Note that if ≥ is anti-symmetric, then the ≥-join and
-meet of a set are unique if they exist.
A partially ordered set (A,≥) is a complete lattice iff every subset of
A has a ≥-join and -meet, and simply a lattice iff this is true for every
two-element subset.
B Suzumura’s extension theorem
An extension theorem will play a crucial role in proving Lemma 1 (ap-
pendix C), the existence theorem (appendix D), and Lemma 4 (appendix E).
Definition 14. Let ≥ and ≥′ be binary relations on a set A. ≥′ is an
extension of ≥ iff for a, b ∈ A, b ≥(>) a implies b ≥′(>′) a.
38Not to be confused with P -chains!
39When ≥ is anti-reflexive, one often sees the equivalent definition ‘there is no b ∈ A
such that a > b’. The two definitions are not equivalent when ≥ fails to be anti-reflexive.
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Definition 15. A binary relation ≥ on a set A is Suzumura-consistent iff
for a1, . . . , aK ∈ A, a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ aK−1 ≥ aK implies that either a1 ≥ aK
or a1, aK are ≥-incomparable.
Transitivity clearly implies Suzumura-consistency, but the converse is
false.
Suzumura’s extension theorem. A binary relation admits a complete
and transitive extension iff it is Suzumura-consistent.
This result is due to Suzumura (1976). A proof may be found in e.g.
Bossert and Suzumura (2010, p. 45). We use the theorem directly in the proof
of the existence theorem (appendix D). In proving Lemma 1 (appendix C)
and Lemma 4 (appendix E), we rely on the following corollary.
Suzumura corollary. Let ≥ be a transitive binary relation on a set A, and
let a, b ∈ A be such that b  a. Then ≥ admits a complete and transitive
extension ≥′ such that a >′ b.
Proof. Let ≥4 be the binary relation on A such that, for any c, d ∈ A,
c ≥4 d iff either (i) c ≥ d or (ii) c = a and d = b. It suffices to show that ≥4
admits a complete and transitive extension to A. So by Suzumura’s extension
theorem, what we must show is that ≥4 is Suzumura-consistent.
To this end, let a1 ≥4 · · · ≥4 aK in A; we must establish that aK ≯4 a1.
Let I = {k ≤ K : ak = a and wk+1 = b}, where K + 1 is treated as 1 by
convention. If I is empty, then a1 ≥4 aK by transitivity of ≥. If I = {k},
suppose toward a contradiction that aK > a1; then b = ak+1 ≥ ak = a by
transitivity of ≥, contradicting the hypothesis that b  a. Finally, suppose
that |I| > 1. Then there exist k1 < k2 such that ak1 = b, ak2 = a, and
ak ≥ ak+1 for all k1 ≤ k < k2. It follows by transitivity of ≥ that b ≥ a, a
contradiction with b  a—thus |I| ≤ 1. 
C Proof of Lemma 1 (§2.1, p. 10)
Fix a P ⊆ P and a pair x, y ∈ X with x & y. The result is immediate if
x = y, so suppose that x > y.
No P -chain: Suppose that there is no P -chain from x to y. Let M be the
(in general, incomplete) binary relation on X such that for z, z′ ∈ X , z M z′
iff z > z′ and there is a P -chain from z to z′. We seek an upper bound ′′ of
P such that y ′′ x. Equivalently, by the UB characterisation lemma (p. 8),
we must show that M admits a complete and transitive extension ′′ such
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that y ′′ x. Since M is obviously transitive, and x 64 y, this follows from
the Suzumura corollary (appendix B).
No strict P -chain: Suppose that there is no strict P -chain from x to y.
We seek an upper bound ′′ of P such that y ′′ x. If there is no P -chain
from x to y, then result follows from the first part of the proof, so assume
that there is a P -chain from x to y.
Let M be the (in general, incomplete) binary relation on X such that
for z, z′ ∈ X , z M z′ iff either (i) z > z′ and there is a P -chain from z to z′,
or (ii) z′ > z and (z′, z) is part of some P -chain from x to y.40 The definition
of M may be rephrased as follows: (a) any distinct z, z′ ∈ X that are not
&-comparable are not M-comparable, (b) for any distinct z, z′ ∈ X that
are &-comparable, wlog z > z′, the following are equivalent: (b1) z, z′ are
M-comparable, (b2) z M z′, and (b3) there is a P -chain from z to z′, and
finally (c) for any z, z′ ∈ X such that z M z′, we have z′ M z if and only if
(z, z′) is part of some P -chain from x to y.
We claim that any complete and transitive extension ′′ of M is an
upper bound of P and satisfies y ′′ x. For the latter, we have x ′′ y by
(b) since there is a P -chain from x to y; hence (x, y) is part of a P -chain
from x to y, whence y ′′ x by (c). For the former, we need ′′ to respect
P -chains and strict P -chains in the sense of the UB characterisation lemma
(p. 8). Since ′′ is reflexive (because it lives in P), it respects P -chains of
length 1. By (b), ′′ respects longer P -chains. To show that is also respects
strict P -chains of length ≥ 2, let z, z′ ∈ X be such that z > z′ and there is a
strict P -chain from z to z′. By (b), z ′′ z′. By (c), we have z ′′ z′ unless
(z, z′) is part of some P -chain from x to y. But the latter cannot be, for this
would produce a strict P -chain from x to y, contradicting our hypothesis.
Thus ′′ is an upper bound of P , and the claim is proved.
It therefore suffices to show that M admits a complete and transit-
ive extension. By Suzumura’s extension theorem (appendix B), this may
be achieved by proving that M is Suzumura-consistent. To that end, fix
w1, . . . , wK ∈ X such that w1 M · · · M wK , and suppose toward a contra-
diction that wK M w1. Then by definition of M, it must be that wK > w1,
there is a P -chain C0 from wK to w1, and (wK , w1) is not part of any P -chain
from x to y. We will construct one P -chain C from x to wK and another
P -chain C ′ from w1 to y, so that the concatenation C ∪C0 ∪C ′ is a P -chain
from x to y. Since (wK , w1) is part of this P -chain from x to y, this yields
the desired contradiction.
40Explicitly, the latter means that there exists a P -chain (wl)Ll=1 from x to y such that
wl = z′ and wl′ = z for some l < l′ ≤ L.
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To construct C, note that since wK > w1, there is no P -chain from w1
to wK . Let k1 be the smallest k ≤ K such that there is a P -chain from wl to
wl+1 for all k ≤ l < K.41 Since there is no P -chain from w1 to wK , we have
k1 > 1. Hence, there is no P -chain from wk1−1 to wk1 . Since wk1−1 M wk1 ,
it follows from the definition of M that wk1 > wk1−1 and that (wk1 , wk1−1)
is part of some P -chain from x to y. Let C1 be the portion of this P -chain
from x to wk1 . Moreover, by definition of k1, there is a (possibly singleton)
P -chain C ′1 from wk1 to wK . The concatenation C = C1 ∪ C ′1 is a P -chain
from x to wK , as desired.
To construct the second P -chain C ′, let k2 be the largest k ≥ 1 such that
there is a P -chain from wl to wl+1 for all l < k.42 Since there is no P -chain
from w1 to wK , we have k2 < k1; hence there is no P -chain from wk2 to
wk2+1. Since wk2 M wk2+1, it follows that wk2+1 > wk2 and (wk2+1, wk2) is
part of some P -chain from x to y. Let C2 be the portion of this P -chain
from wk2 to y. Moreover, by definition of k2, there is a (possibly singleton)
P -chain C ′2 from w1 to wk2 . The concatenation C ′ = C2 ∪ C ′2 is a P -chain
from w1 to y. 
D Proof that (3) implies (1) in the existence theorem (§2.2.3,
p. 15)
For a given P ⊆ P, let ◦ be the (in general, incomplete) binary relation
that satisfies conditions (?)–(??) in the characterisation theorem (p. 9) for
&-comparable pairs of alternatives, and that does not rank &-incomparable
pairs of alternatives. For each P , ◦ clearly exists and is unique.
In light of the characterisation theorem (p. 9), property (1) in the existence
theorem requires precisely that ◦ admit a complete and transitive extension
(i.e. an extension that lives in P) for any P ⊆ P.43 Our task is therefore to
show that whenever & is crown- and diamond-free, ◦ admits a complete
and transitive extension for every P ⊆ P. We will use Suzumura’s extension
theorem (appendix B).
We first state two lemmata, then use them to show that (3) implies (1).
The remainder of this appendix is devoted to proving the lemmata.
Definition 16. A binary relation ≥ on a set A is weakly transitive iff for
a, b, c ∈ A, if a ≥ b ≥ c and a, c are ≥-comparable, then a ≥ c.
◦ is weakly transitive provided & contains no diamonds:
41If this condition fails to hold for every k < K, then k1 = K.
42If this condition fails to hold for every k > 1, then k2 = 1.
43The term ‘extension’ was defined in appendix B.
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Lemma 6 (weak transitivity of ◦). Suppose that & is diamond-free. Then
◦ is weakly transitive for any P ⊆ P.
Weak transitivity is implied by Suzumura-consistency (take K = 3).44
The converse is false in general,45 but true for ◦ when & has no crowns:
Lemma 7 (Suzumura-consistency of ◦). Suppose that & is crown-free.
Then if ◦ is weakly transitive, it is Suzumura-consistent.
Proof that (3) implies (1). Suppose that & is crown- and diamond-free, and
fix any P ⊆ P . Since & is diamond-free, ◦ is weakly transitive by Lemma 6.
Since & is crown-free, it follows by Lemma 7 that ◦ is Suzumura-consistent.
Invoking Suzumura’s extension theorem (appendix B), we conclude that ◦
admits a complete and transitive extension. 
It remains to prove Lemmata 6 and 7. Begin with the former. The role of
diamond-freeness is to ensure the following ‘crossing’ property of decreasing
sequences:
Observation 2. Suppose that & is diamond-free, and consider x, y, z ∈ X
with x > z > y. Let (wk)Kk=1 be a finite decreasing sequence with w1 = x and
wK = y, and let k′ be the last k < K such that wk′ & z. Then z > wk′+1.
Proof. Since w1 = x > z, there exist k < K such that wk & z, so k′ is
well-defined. It cannot be that wk′+1 & z by definition of k′. Nor can it
be that z, wk′+1 are &-incomparable, for then (x, z, wk′+1, y) is a diamond:
x & z & y (by hypothesis), x & wk′+1 & y (since (wk)Kk=1 is decreasing from
x to y), and z, wk′+1 are &-incomparable. Hence z > wk′+1 by anti-symmetry
of &. 
We will use the following piece of notation: given a set A, a sequence
(an)Nn=1 in A and an element b ∈ A, we write (b) ∪ (an)Nn=1 for the sequence
(b, a1, . . . , aN ), and similarly (an)Nn=1 ∪ (b) for the sequence (a1, . . . , aN , b).
Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose that & contains no diamonds, and fix a P ⊆ P
and x, y, z ∈ X such that x ◦ y ◦ z and x, z are ◦-comparable. We must
show that x ◦ z. This is immediate if x, y, z are not distinct, so suppose
that they are. Then by anti-symmetry of &, there are six cases to check: one
for each strict ordering by & of x, y, z.
44Suzumura-consistency was defined in appendix B.
45Consider A = {a, b, c, d} and the binary relation ≥ such that a > b > c > d > a and no
other pairs are ≥-comparable. This relation satisfies weak transitivity, but clearly violates
Suzumura-consistency.
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Case 1: x > y > z. Since x ◦ y and x > y, by (?) there is a P -chain
from x to y. Similarly there is a P -chain from y to z. The concatenation of
these two P -chains is a P -chain from x to z; hence x ◦ z by (?).
Case 2: x > z > y. Since x & y and x ◦ y, there is a P -chain (wk)Kk=1
from x to y by (?). Let k′ be the last k < K for which wk & z, so that
wk′ & z > wk′+1 by Observation 2. By definition of a P -chain, there is a
preference  in P such that wk′  wk′+1. It must be that wk′+1  z, for
otherwise (z) ∪ (wk)Kk=k′+1 would be a strict P -chain from z to y, in which
case y ◦ z by (??), a contradiction. So we have wk′  wk′+1  z, which by
transitivity of  yields wk′  z. It follows that (wk)k′k=1 ∪ (z) is a P -chain
from x to z, so that x ◦ z by (?).
Case 3: y > x > z. This case is similar to the second. Since y & z and
y ◦ z, there is a P -chain (wk)Kk=1 from y to z by (?). Let k′ be the last
k < K for which wk & x, so that wk′ & x > wk′+1 by Observation 2. By
definition of a P -chain, there is a preference  in P such that wk′  wk′+1. It
must be that x  wk′ , for otherwise (wk)k′k=1 ∪ (x) would be a strict P -chain
from y to x, in which case x ◦ y by (??), a contradiction. So we have
x  wk′  wk′+1, which by transitivity of  yields x  wk′+1. It follows that
(x) ∪ (wk)Kk=k′+1 is a P -chain from x to z, so that x ◦ z by (?).
Case 4: y > z > x. Suppose toward a contradiction that x ◦ z. Then
since z & x, by (??) there exists a strict P -chain from z to x. Since y & z
and y ◦ z, there is a P -chain from y to z by (?). Concatenating these
two P -chains yields a strict P -chain from y to x, so that x ◦ y by (??), a
contradiction.
Case 5: z > x > y. This case is similar to the fourth. Suppose toward a
contradiction that x ◦ z. Then since z & x, by (??) there exists a strict
P -chain from z to x. Since x & y and x ◦ y, there is a P -chain from x to y
by (?). Concatenating these two P -chains yields a strict P -chain from z to
y, so that y ◦ z by (??), a contradiction.
Case 6: z > y > x. Suppose toward a contradiction that x ◦ z. Then by
(??), there is a strict P -chain (wk)Kk=1 from z to x. Let k′ be the last k < K
for which wk & y, so that wk′ & y > wk′+1 by Observation 2. By definition of
a P -chain, there is a preference  in P such that wk′  wk′+1. Since (wk)Kk=1
is a strict P -chain, there are k′′ and ′′ ∈ P be such that wk′′ ′′ wk′′+1.
Case 6, sub-case A: k′′ < k′. It must be that y  wk′ , for otherwise
(wk)k
′
k=1 ∪ (y) would be a strict P -chain from y to x, in which case x ◦ y by
(??), a contradiction. So we have y  wk′  wk′+1, which by transitivity of
 yields y  wk′+1. It follows that (y) ∪ (wk)Kk=k′+1 is a strict P -chain from
y to x, so that x ◦ y by (??), a contradiction.
Case 6, sub-case B: k′′ ≥ k′. It must be that y  wk′ , for otherwise
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(wk)k
′
k=1 ∪ (y) would be a strict P -chain from y to x, in which case x ◦ y by
(??), a contradiction. So we have y  wk′  wk′+1, which by transitivity of
 yields y  wk′+1. It follows that (y) ∪ (wk)Kk=k′+1 is a strict P -chain from
y to x, so that x ◦ y by (??), a contradiction. 
It remains to prove Lemma 7.
Definition 17. For a binary relation ≥ on a set A, a weak cycle is a
finite sequence (ak)Kk=1 of distinct elements of A such that ak, ak+1 are
≥-comparable for each 1 ≤ k ≤ K, where aK+1 is understood as a1.
Note that crowns and diamonds are both examples of weak cycles. Crown-
freeness delivers a ‘shortcut’ property of weak cycles:
Observation 3. Let ≥ be a transitive and crown-free binary relation on
a set A. Then for any weak cycle (a1, . . . , aK) in ≥, (a1, ak, aK) is a weak
cycle in ≥ for some 1 < k < K.
Proof. We prove the contra-positive. Suppose that ≥ is transitive and that
there is a weak cycle (a1, . . . , aK) such that (a1, ak, aK) is not a weak cycle
for any 1 < k < K. In particular, choose (a1, . . . , aK) to be a weak cycle of
minimal length with this property. Clearly its length K is ≥ 4. We will show
that (a1, . . . , aK) is a crown.
There are two cases, a1 > a2 and a1 < a2. We consider the former case
only; the latter is analogous. It must be that a2 < a3, for if a2 > a3 then a1, a3
are ≥-comparable by transitivity of ≥, so (a1, a3, . . . , aK) is a weak cycle for
which (a1, ak, aK) is not a weak cycle for any 3 ≤ k < K, contradicting the
minimality of (a1, . . . , aK). Proceeding using the same argument, we conclude
that ak−1 > ak < ak+1 for every 1 < k < K even, where by convention
aK+1 := a1. (This is apparent, separately, for k < K even and for k = K.)
Furthermore, it must be that for 1 ≤ k′ < k′ + 2 ≤ k′′ ≤ K, ak′ , ak′′ are
≥-incomparable, for if they were comparable then (a1, . . . , ak′ , ak′′ , . . . , aK)
would be a weak cycle for which (a1, ak, aK) is not a weak cycle for any
3 ≤ k < K, contradicting the minimality of (a1, . . . , aK). It follows that
(a1, . . . , aK) is a crown. 
Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose that & is crown-free and that ◦ is weakly
transitive. We must show that for every K ≥ 3, the following claim holds:
for any x1, . . . , xK ∈ X , x1 ◦ · · · ◦ xK ◦ x1 implies x1 ◦ xK . C(K)
We proceed by strong induction on K. In the base case K = 3, C(3) is
immediate from weak transitivity of ◦.
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Now suppose that C(K ′) holds for all K ′ ≤ K−1; we will establish C(K).
Take any x1, . . . , xK ∈ X with x1 ◦ · · · ◦ xK ◦ x1, wlog distinct. Since
◦ compares all and only &-comparable pairs of alternatives, (x1, . . . , xK) is
a weak cycle in &. Since & (transitive and) crown-free, Observation 3 implies
the existence of a 1 < k < K such that (x1, xk, xK) is a weak cycle in &. We
consider three cases.
Case 1: k = 2. Since x2 ◦ · · · ◦ xK ◦ x2, the inductive hypothesis (in
particular, C(K − 1)) implies that x2 ◦ xK . Since x1 ◦ x2, and x1, xK are
◦-comparable because they are &-comparable, it follows by weak transitivity
that x1 ◦ xK .
Case 2: k = K − 1. This case is analogous to the first.
Case 3: 2 < k < K − 1. Since x1 ◦ · · · ◦ xk and x1, xk are ◦-
comparable (because they are &-comparable), the inductive hypothesis (in
particular, C(k)) implies that x1 ◦ xk. Similarly, xk ◦ · · · ◦ xK , the
&-comparability of xk, xK and the inductive hypothesis yield xk ◦ xK .
Since x1, xK are ◦-comparable (because they are &-comparable), it follows
by weak transitivity that x1 ◦ xK . 
E Proof of Lemma 4 (§2.3, p. 17)
Since & is transitive, and x, y are &-incomparable, the Suzumura corollary
(appendix B, p. 36) implies that & admits complete and transitive extensions
′,′′ ∈ P such that x ′ y and y ′′ x. ′ is an upper bound of P (and
hence of any P ⊆ P) because whenever z &(>) w, we have z ′(′) w since
′ extends &; thus the consequent in the definition of ‘′ S ’ (p. 2) is
satisfied for any z, w ∈ X and  ∈ P. Similarly for ′′.
F Results for meets
The following observation permits us easily to obtain analogues of the
characterisation and existence theorems and the uniqueness proposition for
maximum lower bounds.
Definition 18. Let ≥ be a binary relation on a set A. The inverse of ≥,
denoted ≤, is the binary relation such that for a, b ∈ A, a ≤ b iff b ≥ a.
Duality observation. Let S& denote the single-crossing-dominance relation
induced by the primitive order & on X , and let . be the inverse of &. S. is
the inverse of S&.
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Proof. Simply observe that for any ,′ ∈ P,
′ S&  ⇐⇒ x & y and x () y imply x ′(′) y
⇐⇒ y . x and y ′(′) x imply y () x ⇐⇒  S. ′,
which is to say that S. is the inverse of S&. 
It follows that a S&-maximum S&-lower bound is precisely a S.-minimum
S.-upper bound. In light of this observation, the analogue of the character-
isation theorem for meets is immediate:
Definition 19. For a set P ⊆ P of preferences and two alternatives y & x
in X , a reverse P -chain from y to x is a finite sequence (wk)Kk=1 in X such
that
(i) w1 = y and wK = x,
(ii′) for every k < K, wk . wk+1, and
(iii) for every k < K, wk  wk+1 for some  ∈ P .
A strict reverse P -chain is a reverse P -chain with wk  wk+1 for some k < K
and  ∈ P .
Corollary 4 (meet characterisation). For any P ⊆ P, the following are
equivalent:
(1′) ? is a maximum lower bound of P .
(2′) ? is complete and transitive (lives in P), and satisfies: for any &-
comparable x, y ∈ X , wlog y & x,
(?′) x ? y iff there is a reverse P -chain from x to y, and
(??′) y ? x iff there is no strict reverse P -chain from x to y.
Since . is crown- and diamond-free (complete) iff & is, the existence
theorem (uniqueness proposition) extends as follows:
Corollary 5 (meet & join existence). The following are equivalent:
(1) Every set of preferences has a minimum upper bound.
(2) Every set of preferences has a maximum lower bound.
(3) & is crown- and diamond-free.
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Corollary 6 (meet & join uniqueness). The following are equivalent:
(1) Every set of preferences has at most one minimum upper bound.
(2) Every set of preferences has exactly one minimum upper bound.
(3) Every set of preferences has at most one maximum lower bound.
(4) Every set of preferences has exactly one maximum lower bound.
(5) & is complete.
G Proof of Corollary 1 (§3.2, p. 20)
Equip the space 2P \{∅} of non-empty sets of preferences with the S-induced
strong set order w. It is easily verified that w is a partial order. The consensus
C is a correspondence 2P \{∅} ⇒ X , and Proposition 1 (p. 19) says precisely
that it is increasing.
Let Π be the set of P ⊆ P at which C(P ) is non-empty. The restriction
of C to Π is a non-empty-valued increasing correspondence into X ⊆ R. It
follows by Theorem 2.7 in Kukushkin (2013) that it admits an increasing
selection φ : Π→ X .46
Let
U(P ) := {P ′′ ∈ Π : P ′′ w P} for each non-empty P ⊆ P,
and define the SCF ψ : 2P \ {∅} → X by
ψ(P ) :=
{
inf {φ(P ′′) : P ′′ ∈ U(P )} if U(P ) 6= ∅
supX otherwise.
The map ψ is well-defined, and really does map into X , because (X ,≥) is
a complete lattice by compactness of X and the Frink–Birkhoff theorem.47
Since ψ = φ on Π (because φ is increasing) and φ is a selection from C, the
SCF ψ respects unanimity.
To see that ψ is monotone, consider P, P ′ ∈ P with P ′ w P . Observe
that U(P ′) ⊆ U(P ). If U(P ′) is empty then ψ(P ′) = supX ≥ ψ(P ) since
ψ(P ) ∈ X . If U(P ) is empty then so is U(P ′), putting us in the previous
case. If neither is empty then
ψ(P ′) = inf
{
φ(P ′′) : P ′′ ∈ U(P ′)} ≥ inf {φ(P ′′) : P ′′ ∈ U(P )} = ψ(P ). 
46This step is non-trivial because X and P need not be finite, or even countable.
47See e.g. Topkis (1998, Theorem 2.3.1).
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Figure 3 – The transitive reductions of the subposets in Definition 20. (Since
only the transitive reductions are drawn, the fact that a > c in the ball and
chain and the first hook and that c > a in the second hook is implicit.)
H Elaboration and proof of the (im)possibility theorem (§5.3,
p. 33)
In this appendix, we elaborate on the (im)possibility theorem by adding a
third equivalence in terms of forbidden subposets (§H.1), then give the proof
(§H.2).
H.1 Elaboration of the (im)possibility theorem
It is possible to recast the (im)possibility theorem as a ‘forbidden subposet’
theorem, much as we did with the existence theorem in appendix I. In
particular, (X ,&) being a fork or shattered fork is equivalent to the absence
from & of 4-crowns and diamonds as well as four other four-element subposets:
balls-and-chains, hooks, dumbbells and saws. These posets are drawn in
Figure 3, and explicitly defined as follows.
Definition 20. Let ≥ be a binary relation on a set A, and let (a, b, c, d) be
four distinct elements.
(1) (a, b, c, d) is a ball and chain iff a > b > c and a > c, and no other pair
of elements is ≥-comparable.
(2) (a, b, c, d) is a hook iff either a > b > c < d and a > c or (dually)
a < b < c > d and a < c, and no other pair of elements is ≥-comparable.
(3) (a, b, c, d) is a pair of dumbbells iff a > b and c > d, and no other pair
of elements is ≥-comparable.
(4) (a, b, c, d) is a saw iff a > b < c > d, and no other pair of elements is
≥-comparable.
We have the following strengthening of the (im)possibility theorem:
Elaborated (im)possibility theorem. The following are equivalent:
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(1) There exists an acceptable SWF.
(2) (X ,&) is either a fork or a shattered fork.
(3) & is free from 4-crowns, diamonds, balls-and-chains, hooks, dumbbells
and saws.
Note that by ruling out saws, we rule out K-crowns for K ≥ 6 even, since
these contains saws.
H.2 Proof of the elaborated (im)possibility theorem
Proof that (1) implies (3). We prove the contra-positive. 4-crowns and dia-
monds are ruled out by Lemma 5 (p. 31) and the existence theorem (p. 15).
For the remainder, it suffices by Lemma 5 to provide, for each forbidden
subposet, a pair of preferences pi = (1,2) ∈ Pn which possess no minimum
upper bound ? such that x ?(?) y whenever x i(i) y for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Example 1 (pp. 7, 32) does the job for a hook. For a ball and chain
(x, y, z, w),
z 1 w 1 x 1 y and y 2 z 2 w 2 x
is an example. For a pair of dumbbells (x, y, z, w),
x 1 y 1 z 1 w and z 2 w 2 x 2 y
is an example. For a saw (x, y, z, w),
w 1 x 1 y 1 z and y 2 z 2 w 2 x
is an example. 
Proof that (3) implies (2). Suppose that (3) holds; we will argue that (X ,&)
must be a fork or a shattered fork. By inspection, the only species of four-
element subposet permitted by (3) are (three-pronged) fork heads and the
following:
w
z
y
x
w
z
x y x
y
z w
(A)
w
z
x y w
x
y z
y
x
z w x y z w (B)
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It is tedious but straightforward to verify that (3) does not allow subposets
of both types (A) and (B). It is clear that only upward (downward) fork
heads are compatible with the second (third) subposet in (A) and with the
first (second) subposet in (B).
That leaves two possibilities. The first is that every four-element subposet
is an upward (downward) three-pronged fork head, the first subposet in (A),
or the second (third) subposet in (A). In that case, (X ,&) is evidently an
up-fork (down-fork).
The second possibility is that every subposet is an upward (downward)
three-pronged fork head, the first (second) subposet in (B), or one of the
third and fourth subposets in (B). In that case, (X ,&) is a shattered up-fork
(down-fork). 
Proof that (2) implies (1). Suppose that (X ,&) is a fork or shattered fork.
By Lemma 5 (p. 31), what we must show is that for any pi = (1, . . . ,n) ∈
Pn, there is a minimum upper bound  ∈ P of pi that satisfies the following
conditional Pareto property: x ?(?) y whenever x i(i) y for every
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and there is no (strict) pi-chain from y to x. To that end, fix
an arbitrary preference profile pi ∈ Pn.
Fork: Suppose that (X ,&) is a fork, wlog an up-fork. Then X can be
partitioned as X = X ∪{x}∪Y , where X ∪{x} is an upward fork head with
minimum element x and {x} ∪ Y is a chain with maximum element x.
Since & is crown- and diamond-free, pi has minimum upper bounds. Let
? be an arbitrary minimum upper bound. Partition X into sets {Xk}Kk=1
such that x′, x′′ ∈ X belong to the same Xk if and only if, for any z in the
&-chain {x} ∪ Y , x′ ?(?) z if and only if x′′ ?(?) z.
Note that, since X ∪ {x} is an upward fork head with minimum element
x, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K, the elements of Xk are mutually &-incomparable.
Moreover, for any x′ ∈ X, since Y ∪ {x, x′} is a &-chain, all minimum
upper bounds of pi agree on Y ∪ {x, x′} by the uniqueness proposition (p.
17). It follows that, for any (k)Kk=1 where k is a preference on Xk for all
1 ≤ k ≤ K, there exists a minimum upper bound ?? of pi that agrees with
k on Xk for each k ≤ K.
k may clearly be chosen to satisfy the conditional Pareto property on
every pair in Xk for each 1 ≤ k ≤ K. It thus suffices to show that ??
satisfies the conditional Pareto property on pairs x′, y′ that do not both lie
in a single Xk. So suppose that x′ i(i) y′ for every i and that there is no
(strict) pi-chain from y′ to x′; we will deduce that x′ ??(??) y′.
There are two cases. First, suppose that one of x′ and y′ belongs to the
&-chain {x}∪Y . Then x′ and y′ are &-comparable, so the result follows from
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properties (?)–(??) in the characterisation theorem (p. 9). Second, suppose
that neither x′ nor y′ belongs to {x} ∪ Y . Since they do not belong to the
same Xk by hypothesis, there is a z ∈ {x}∪Y such that either (i) x′ ?(?) z
and y′ ?(?) z, or (ii) vice-versa. Since x′ i(i) y′ for every i, it must be
(i) that obtains. Therefore x′ ?? y′, as desired.
Shattered fork: Suppose that (X ,&) is a shattered fork. Then X may be
partitioned as X = X ∪ Y , where X is a fork head, wlog an upward fork
head, and Y is a set of isolated elements. Write x0 ∈ X for the minimum
element of the upward fork head X.
Let ≥′ be the binary relation on X such that, for any &-comparable
x, y ∈ X , wlog x & y, ≥′ satisfies properties (?)–(??) in the characterisation
theorem (p. 9) and, for any &-unranked x, y, x ≥′ y if and only if x i y
for every i. Let ≥′′ be the transitive closure of ≥′. Since ≥′′ is transitive,
it admits a complete and transitive extension ≥? by Suzumura’s extension
theorem (appendix B). We will show that ≥? is a minimum upper bound of
pi and that it satisfies the conditional Pareto property.
For the conditional Pareto property, it suffices to show that, for any
x, y ∈ X such that there is no (strict) pi-chain from y to x and further
x i(i) y for every i, we have x >′′(≥′′) y. Note that, if there is no (strict)
pi-chain from y to x and x i(i) y for every i, then x ≥′ y. It remains only
to show that if there is no pi-chain from y to x and x i y for every i, then
x >′′ y.
So suppose toward a contradiction that there is no pi-chain from y to x
and that x i y for every i, and yet y ≥′′ x. Since ≥′′ is the transitive closure
of ≥′, there exists a ≥′-decreasing sequence (wk)Kk=1 with w1 = y and wK = x;
we will show that this is impossible. We proceed by strong induction on the
length K ≥ 2 of the sequence. The base case K = 2 follows by definition
of ≥′. For the inductive step, take K ′ > 2, and suppose that there is no
≥-decreasing sequence of length K from y to x for any K < K ′. Toward
a contradiction, suppose that there is a ≥′-decreasing sequence (wk)K′k=1 of
length K ′ from y to x. There are two cases.
Case 1.1: There is at most one k′ < K ′ such that there is a pi-chain
from wk′ to wk′+1. Fix k′, and note that wk i wk+1 for every i and k 6= k′.
By hypothesis, we have x i y for every i. It follows by transitivity that
wk′+1 i wk′ . Since all pi-chains have length at most 2, there is no pi-chain
from wk′ to wk′+1. But then, since wk′+1 i wk′ for every i, it cannot be
that wk′ ≥′ wk′+1—a contradiction.
Case 1.2: There are k1 < k2 < K ′ such that there is a pi-chain from wkn to
wkn+1 for n = 1, 2. Then, since all pi-chains end at x0, wk1+1 = wk2+1 = x0.
Then (w1, . . . , wk1 , wk2+1, . . . , wK) is a ≥′-chain and, since k1 < k2, it has
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length < K ′. This contradicts the inductive hypothesis.
It remains to show that ≥? is a minimum upper bound of pi. Since ≥?
is an extension of ≥′′, it suffices by the characterisation theorem (p. 9) to
show that for any x > y, ≥′′ satisfies properties (?)–(??). Since ≥′′ is the
transitive closure of ≥′ and ≥′ satisfies (?)–(??), we need only show that (a)
y 6≥′′ x if there is a strict pi-chain from x to y, and that (b) x 6≥′′ y if there is
no pi-chain from x to y.
Claim (b) is easy: suppose toward a contradiction that there is no pi-chain
from x to y, and yet x ≥′′ y. Since x > y by assumption, it follows that
y i x for every i. Then the argument used to show that ≥? satisfies the
conditional Pareto property applies, yielding a contradiction.
To prove (a), suppose toward a contradiction that there is a strict pi-chain
from x to y, yet y ≥′′ x. Then there exists a ≥′-decreasing sequence (wk)Kk=1
from w1 = y to wK = x. We show by strong induction on K ≥ 2 that
this is impossible. The base case K = 2 follows by definition of ≥′. For the
inductive step, take any K ′ > 2, and suppose that for all K < K ′, there is
no ≥′-decreasing sequence of length K from y to x. Toward a contradiction,
suppose that (wk)K
′
k=1 is a ≥′-decreasing sequence of length K ′. There are
two cases.
Case 2.1: For some k < K ′, there is a pi-chain from wk to wk+1. Then,
since all pi-chains end at x0, wk+1 = y = x0. Then, as above, the induction
hypothesis produces a contradiction.
Case 2.2: For every k < K ′, there is no pi-chain from wk to wk+1. Then
since wk ≥′ wk+1, we have wk i wk+1 for every i. It follows by transitivity
that y i x for every i. Since all pi-chains have length 2, this contradicts the
existence of a strict pi-chain from x to y. 
Supplemental appendices
I A characterisation of crown- and diamond-freeness
In this appendix, we provide an alternative way of thinking about crown-
and diamond-freeness of & by showing that it is equivalent to the absence
of weak cycles and chalices in the transitive reduction, or Hasse diagram.
This provides a novel way to interpret the existence theorem (p. 15). X is
assumed finite for this result.
Definition 21. The transitive reduction of a transitive binary relation ≥
on a set A is the smallest binary relation whose transitive closure is ≥.48
48The transitive closure of a binary relation ≥ is the smallest transitive binary relation
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321
123
231
213
312
132
(a) A partial order.
321
123
231
213
312
132
(b) Its transitive reduction.
Figure 4 – The diagram of a partial order and of its transitive reduction. (In
fact, the depicted poset is (P†, S), where P† = {123, 213, 231, 132, 312, 321} is
the set of anti-symmetric preferences over alternatives X = {1, 2, 3} ordered
by ≥ (i.e. 3 > 2 > 1), and S is single-crossing dominance.)
c d
e1
a b
(a)
c d
e2
e1
a b
(b)
c d
e3
e2
e1
a b
(c)
Figure 5 – Chalices.
Provided A is finite, the transitive reduction exists and is unique for any
binary relation ≥.
A common way to graphically depict a partial order is to draw only its
transitive reduction—this is called a Hasse diagram. The transitive reduction
may be found by deleting, one by one, any edges (‘links’) that are implied
by other edges via transitivity. An example is drawn in Figure 4.
Definition 22. Given an anti-symmetric relation ≥ on a set A, a chalice
is five or more distinct elements (a, b, e1, . . . , eK , c, d) such that a, b ≥ e1 ≥
· · · ≥ eK ≥ c, d and a, b and c, d are ≥-incomparable. ≥ is chalice-free iff it
contains no chalices.
Some chalices are drawn in Figure 5.
Proposition 4 (characterisation of crown- and diamond-freeness). For a
partial order ≥ on a finite set A, the following are equivalent:
that contains ≥.
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(1) ≥ is crown- and diamond-free.
(2) The transitive reduction of ≥ is weak-cycle- and chalice-free.49
Proposition 4 provides a straightforward graphical interpretation of crown-
and diamond-freeness. For example, the partial order drawn in Figure 4a must
have a crown or diamond since its transitive reduction in Figure 4b contains
a weak cycle. And indeed, it contains several diamonds: (321, 231, 312, 123)
is one, and there are three others.
For the proof, we rely on a close cousin of Proposition 4 due to Ball et al.
(2006).
Definition 23. Let ≥ be a binary relation on a set A. A 4-crown (a, b, c, d)
in ≥ improper iff there is an e ∈ A such that a, c ≥ e ≥ b, d, and proper
otherwise.
Proposition 5 (Ball et al. (2006, Proposition 3.1)). For a partial order ≥
on a finite set A, the following are equivalent:
(1) ≥ is free of diamonds, of K-crowns for K ≥ 6 even, and of proper
4-crowns.
(2) The transitive reduction of ≥ is weak-cycle-free.
Proposition 5 implies that improper 4-crowns are consistent with the
absence of weak cycles in the transitive reduction.50 Our Proposition 4 asserts
that to avoid improper 4-crowns in ≥, it is necessary and sufficient for the
transitive reduction to be chalice-free.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that ≥ is crown- and diamond-free, and let
≥> be its transitive reduction. Then ≥> is weak-cycle-free by Proposition 5,
and cannot contain a chalice (a, c, e1, . . . , eK , b, d) since then (a, b, c, d) would
be a 4-crown in ≥.
Suppose that the transitive reduction ≥> of ≥ is weak-cycle- and chalice-
free. By Proposition 5, we need only rule out improper 4-crowns. Suppose
49Weak cycles were defined in appendix D (p. 41).
50For example, consider the poset
b d
a c
e
with transitive reduction
b d
a c
e
The transitive reduction is weak-cycle free, but (a, b, c, d) is an improper 4-crown.
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toward a contradiction that ≥ contains an improper 4-crown (a′, b′, c′, d′).
Define a (c) to be the ≥-smallest element that is ≥-comparable to a′ (to c′)
but ≥-incomparable to c′ (to a′), and similarly define b and d. Observe that
(a, b, c, d) is also an improper 4-crown in ≥.
The set
E = {e ∈ A : a, c ≥ e ≥ b, d}
is non-empty since (a, b, c, d) is improper. Furthemore, E is a ≥-chain: for if
to the contrary e, e′ ∈ E are ≥-incomparable, then either (i) e∨ e′ and e∧ e′
exist, in which case (e ∨ e′, e, e′, e ∧ e′) is a diamond in ≥, or (ii) e ∨ e′ fails
to exist, in which case (a, e, c, e′) is a proper 4-crown in ≥, or (iii) e ∧ e′ fails
to exist, in which case (e, b, e′, d) is a proper 4-crown in ≥. We may therefore
enumerate E as e1 ≥> · · · ≥> eK . Then (a, c, e1, . . . , eK , b, d) is a chalice in
≥>, a contradiction. 
J Non-emptiness is essential in Proposition 2 (§3.3, p. 21)
The following example shows that without the hypothesis that X() is
non-empty for each  ∈ P ∪ P ′, the conclusion of Proposition 2 may fail.
Example 8. Consider X = N, with ≥ the usual inequality. Let ,′ ∈ P
be represented by the utility functions u and u′ defined by
u(x) :=
{
1/x for x ∈ X odd
0 for x ∈ X even and u
′(x) :=
{
0 for x ∈ X odd
1/x for x ∈ X even.
Clearly X() = {1} and X(′) = {2}. By the uniqueness proposition (p.
17), since ≥ is complete, {,′} has exactly one join and one meet.
We claim that the join and meet are & and its inverse ., respectively.51
To see this, observe that x + 2  x + 1 ′ x for all x ∈ X odd. It follows
that for any x′ > x, (x′, x′ − 1, . . . , x + 1, x) is a strict {,′}-chain, and
that (x, x+ 1, . . . , x′ − 1, x′) is a strict reverse {,′}-chain.52 It follows by
the characterisation theorem (p. 9) that & and . and the join and meet,
respectively.
Now let P := {′,.} and P ′ := {,&}. P ′ dominates P in the S-induced
strong set order, so a fortiori in the alternative set order. Since X(&) is
empty and X(.) = {1}, we have X(P ) = {1, 2} and X(P ′) = {1}. X(P ′)
fails to dominate X(P ) in the alternative set order: taking x = 2 ∈ X(P )
and x′ = 1 ∈ X(P ′), there is no y′ in X(P ′) such that y′ & x ∨ x′ = 2.
51The inverse of a binary relation was defined in appendix F (p. 42).
52Strict reverse P -chains were defined in appendix F (p. 43).
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